In previous posts, I took AWS to task for not making the customer’s security Job Zero. This offended some sensibilities, so let me lay out my ~~95~~ 13 Thesis against the current AWS Culture and how it is neither Customer-Obsessed, nor makes security job zero.
How AWS needs to change.
- End the complete independence of the two-pizza team1. Yes, it makes AWS move faster, but the counter to that is that each team does its own thing. There are no enterprise standards to ensure a consistent customer experience. This is obvious with the complete chaos that is the IAM Action prefixing (Get, List Describe - pick two, three, or four).
- End the culture of secrecy. Most releases aren’t a competitive advantage. Deploy docs a week out and let customers respond to what’s coming. Dropping AssumeRoot on an unsuspecting world on a Thursday afternoon led to a lot of emergency Friday push-to-production changes. Nor is breaking your most dedicated customers:
- Stop hiding behind Shared Responsibility.
- The lack of IMDSv2 was key to the Capital One incident. - Security services and IaC should be a promise.
- Stop launching new regions without GuardDuty.
- Stop launching new services without CloudFormation Support. - Not all features are for all customers (like kms:ImportKeyMaterial).
- Perhaps start with service quotas, or make the default SCP not Action:* - Security should be job zero, and it should be free. Stop up-charging for key logs and telemetry. You’re not Micro$oft.
- CloudTrail data events should be free
- You need to offer a CSPM that does not cost a whole percentage point (or more) of the total AWS bill. - Customers are desperate for consistency in IAM Actions. We need clear ways to build our security invariants.
- Move all new networking actions to avpc:namespace
- Give us clear API actions that delineate between Data Access and Metadata Access
- If ABAC is going to be your “best practice”, then all services - especially core services - must support it. - Secure Defaults are critical.
- The EC2 Launch Wizard must stop defaulting to 0.0.0.0/0 - Your customers don’t know how their cloud works. They need help.
- Add new IAM Effects:Audit-AllowandAudit-Deny. Let us see what an SCP/RCP would do before we apply it in production. I shouldn’t need Splunk, Chronicle, or Defender to figure out I’m not going to blow up my company when I introduce a new SCP or RCP. - Stop letting customers shoot themselves in the foot with Organizations
- Don’t let them create an organization in an account where an ENI exists
- Startup credits need to apply to an AWS Organization. You’re incentivizing poor security behavior when you offer credits that don’t work in an AWS Organization. - Console warnings are fine, but IaC is the major problem.
- anywhere there is a console warning, you need to add something to the API that’s a--yes-I-really-mean-to-do-thisflag.
- That needs to apply to CloudFormation, Terraform, Pulimi, CDK, etc.
i-acknowledge-im-doing-something-dumb = true - All IAM Actions are logged - no hidden usage of access keys.
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Maybe it’s time for new services not to be callable by IAM Users.
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This is wrong:
We want to operate like the world’s largest startup. That means having a passion for constantly inventing for customers, strong urgency (for most big opportunities, it’s a race!), high ownership, fast decision-making, scrappiness and frugality ↩︎