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Vulnerability remediation that actually closes

单站 ProjectDiscovery Blog 入库 2026-11-17T04:35:34

Validated findings across external, internal, cloud and code become evidence-backed issues routed to their owners, fixed by pull request with a regression test, and retested after merge, in one living context.

IssuesBoard

BoardListSLA

Triaging2

ISSUE-2048ML

Grafana admin reachable without SSO

HighReasoning

ISSUE-2044AC

IDOR on invoice download for org members

LowReasoning

Validated3

ISSUE-2041PR

Race condition in coupon redemption

High

ISSUE-2033SO

Password reset token reusable after use

Medium

ISSUE-2027JP

Public S3 bucket serving support uploads

Low

Fixed · Retesting3

ISSUE-2019ML

Team invite links valid after revocation

MediumRetesting

ISSUE-2011SO

Session cookie missing SameSite on SSO

LowRetesting

ISSUE-1998AC

Verification emails leak tenant names

IssuesRace condition in coupon redemption

ISSUE-2041

Race condition in coupon redemption

SeverityHigh

StatusValidated

AssigneePRPriya Raman

Owner fromCODEOWNERS

Filed toLinear SEC-342, 2d ago

Targetcheckout.acme.com/api/cart/apply-coupon

EvidenceActivityAssets

Reproduce
1. 1Fetch a single-use code (WELCOME20) for a cart on checkout.acme.com.
2. 2Send POST /api/cart/apply-coupon three times in parallel with the same code and cart token.
3. 3All three return 200; the code is applied three times and the total drops to 0.00.

checkout.acme.com·apply-coupon · 3 parallel requestsOpen 1POST /api/cart/apply-coupon HTTP/22host: checkout.acme.com3{ "code": "WELCOME20", "cart_token": "ct_9f2…41a" } // sent ×3, same instant45HTTP/2 200 OK6{ "applied": ["WELCOME20", "WELCOME20", "WELCOME20"],7 "total": 0.00, "was": 128.00 }SEC-342Race condition in coupon redemptionPR Priya RamanOpen High Todo, Security

Subscribed···

StatusFixed

Fixacme/checkout #482

ActivityEvidenceAssets

  1. Pull request openedby Neo, 2d agoacme/checkout#482Make coupon redemption atomic+18−6Open42 const c = await db.coupon.findFirst({ where: { code, redeemed: false } });43 await db.coupon.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data: { redeemed: true } });42 const { count } = await db.coupon.updateMany({43 where: { code, redeemed: false }, data: { redeemed: true } });44 if (count === 0) throw new ConflictError('coupon already redeemed');test/coupon.regression.test.ts Passing
  2. MergedPriya Raman, 3h ago
  3. Retest passed2h ago Replayed the original exchange against checkout.acme.com: one 200, two 409.

IssuesSLA

49Open

41Within SLA

6At risk

2Breached

9.4dMedian to verified fix

IssueTitleSeverityOwnerPolicyTime to breachState

ISSUE-2033Password reset token reusable after useMediumSOSam Okafor90dbreached 3dFix open

ISSUE-2048Grafana admin reachable without SSOHighMLMarco Lee30d2d leftFix open

ISSUE-2019Team invite links valid after revocationMediumMLMarco Lee90d41d leftRetesting

ISSUE-2027Public S3 bucket serving support uploadsLowJPJin Park180d96d leftValidated

ISSUE-2044IDOR on invoice download for org membersLowACAda Cruz180d152d leftValidated

Verified this week

ISSUE-2041Race condition in coupon redemptionHighPRPriya Raman30dmet in 19dVerified

ISSUE-2011Session cookie missing SameSite on SSOLowSOSam Okafor180dmet in 60dVerified

ISSUE-1998Verification emails leak tenant namesLowACAda Cruz180dmet in 12dVerified

Regression

ISSUE-2041 reopened

Race condition in coupon redemption

HighPR Priya Raman checkout.acme.comFixed42d ago#482 merged, retest passedReopened14 min agoa41c9f2 reproduced the exploit SEC-342 reopened #securityPR Priya Raman notifiedacme/checkouta41c9f2refactor(cart): extract CartServiceML Marco Leeservices/cart.ts118 async redeemCoupon(code: string) {119 const { count } = await db.coupon.updateMany({120 where: { code, redeemed: false }, data: { redeemed: true } });121 if (count === 0) throw new ConflictError('coupon already redeemed');119 const c = await this.coupons.find(code);120 if (c.redeemed) throw new ConflictError();121 await this.coupons.markRedeemed(c.id); // no longer atomic

  1. Retest reproduced the exploit14 min ago
  2. Reopened SEC-342Priya Raman notified
  3. Drafting a fix…

Closed means the original exploit was replayed against the patched target and failed. The before and after exchanges stay on the issue, so nobody has to take a fix on trust.

Fixed issues are retested on a schedule and whenever surrounding code or dependencies change. When one reproduces again, it reopens linked to the original, with the commit that undid the fix.

Open backlog by team, service and severity; time to verified fix; SLA compliance and regression rate, all computed from retests rather than ticket states. Reports for engineering, leadership and auditors.

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原文链接:https://projectdiscovery.io/solutions/vulnerability-remediation