Issue #287
Monday · November 16, 2026
🥖 Palate Cleanser
Thanks, everyone, for all the kind words and support on last week's Top 10 AWS Security Research announcement. In case you missed it, you can watch the discussion or read the full list.
Cognito got some really nice improvements. With token exchange, a service or AI agent acting for a user can swap the user's token for a narrower one that only works with one downstream service, instead of the broad original. With session management, you can list a user's active sessions across all their devices and apps and revoke any of them - I wonder what the lag is on enforcement.
Cloud Village posted its DEF CON 34 labs this week, including Breaking AWS Bedrock: Novel Attack Techniques Against Cloud Infrastructure and Agentic Cloud Hacking: Solving CTFs with AI.
Finally, in this week's episode of wild things people tell me: "AI is eliminating software vulnerabilities." Ummm... Also this week, AWS API MCP Server turned operation names into CLI commands with re.sub('([A-Z])', r'-\1', operation).lower().lstrip('-') before checking them against a deny list. That worked fine for DeleteBucket → delete-bucket but not so fine for DeactivateMFADevice → deactivate-m-f-a-device. State-of-the-art vulnerability eliminated.
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📋 Chef's selections
Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild
by Zack Morrow, Sean Johnstone and Benjamin Read
As someone who works for a cloud vendor, this is my nightmare. Qubole is a big data platform. It accesses customer AWS accounts through roles with trust relationships to Qubole's AWS account. An attacker got hold of access keys for two IAM users in Qubole's account and assumed a bunch of customer roles. Most of the customer roles were otherwise unused during October. Some were even no longer required and just weren't deprovisioned. The attacker rummaged through Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM parameters, and downloaded whole S3 buckets. More details here.
On the hunt for ARTEX: understanding agentic attacks in AWS environments
The level of exasperation around autonomous hacking agents has been steadily increasing over the last few months. Stuff like this is why. ARTEX is an AI pentest framework where an operator names a target and a team of LLM agents plans and runs an attack. It passed 12,000 forks on GitHub before going closed-source in October. An English-translated open-source copy lives on. Julie got to see it being used in the wild, including inside AWS environments. With a leaked access key, it searched CloudWatch for hedge funds and crypto firms, probably at an operator's direction. Without keys, it signed itself up to a public Cognito user pool, swapped its tokens for AWS credentials and tried nearly every read-only call it could, all denied. Helpfully, it had a tendency to use user agents like artex-pentest/1.0.
AWS also saw ARTEX at work. It runs honeypots called MadPot, and some of them pretend to be LLM APIs. Attack agents that AWS believes ran on ARTEX sent their requests there. Each request included the agent's memory, which often had the whole campaign, so AWS could read what the attackers were up to. For example, one group was trying to beat crypto exchanges' live selfie checks with a deepfake.
How to set up IAM Roles Anywhere automatic certificate revocation checking
Paul's obsession with certificates continues. IAM Roles Anywhere mints AWS credentials for workloads outside AWS that hold an X.509 certificate. It can now check revocation on its own by fetching the certificate revocation list (CRL) from the distribution point named in the certificate, so no more scripted CRL uploads to the trust anchor. Paul walks through it end to end with his open-source serverless CA.
🥗 AWS security blogs
- 📢 AWS Security Hub CSPM now supports centralized configuration with AWS Organizations declarative policies
- 📢 AWS Secrets Manager now supports cross-account replication
- 📢 Amazon Cognito now supports OAuth 2.0 token exchange
- 📢 Amazon Aurora and RDS now support Graviton5-based R9g database instances
- 📢 Amazon Route 53 now supports record set protection
- 📢 Amazon Cognito now supports user pool session management
- 📢 Amazon EKS Auto Mode now supports security groups for Pods
- 📢 AWS Network Firewall launches next-generation firewall policy
- 📢 Amazon ElastiCache Serverless now supports vector, full-text and hybrid searches plus aggregations
- 📢 Amazon CloudWatch Logs announces account-level retention policies
- 📢 AWS STS now supports cross-partition federation for AWS identities
- 📢 Amazon Athena introduces system tables for observability, auditing, and usage analytics
- Bring AWS Security Hub CSPM findings into your Amazon CloudWatch on-call workflow by Samir Behara
- AWS Weekly Roundup: AgentCore Runtime V2, Amazon DynamoDB bulk put items, and more (November 9, 2026) by Daniel Abib
- Scaling real-time bidding and publisher monetization with the AWS Video Streaming Advertising Lens by Abraham Lobo
- Amazon Threat Intelligence observes threat actors running cybercrime campaigns with ARTEX AI agents by CJ Moses
- Ease of use and secure defaults in the new AWS experience by Keshav Narsipur
- Part 4 – Cybersecurity journeys: What I’d tell my younger self by Shannon Brazil
- Reduce alert fatigue by customizing threat detection features in Amazon GuardDuty by Allan Holmes
- AWS refreshes ProcessUnity Global Risk Exchange assessment to enhance customer’s third-party due diligence by Naranjan Goklani
- Digital sovereignty at re:Invent 2026: Sessions you won’t want to miss by Baqir Naqvi
- Help defend against memory poisoning in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore with multi-layer write validation by Tarun Kumar
- Simplify cross-partition access with AWS IAM outbound identity federation by Bill Wells
🍛 Reddit threads on r/aws
🤖 Dessert
Every machine-tracked change this week. Nobody else assembles this.
🧁 IAM permission changes
🍪 API changes
🍹 IAM managed policy changes
☕ CloudFormation resource changes
No resource updates this week.
📺 AWS security bulletins
- CVE-2026-124034, CVE-2026-124035: Issues with Amazon Braket SDK
- CVE-2026-125926 - Server-side request forgery in the server registration and update API in mcp-gateway-registry
- CVE-2026-125271 - AWS API MCP Server Security Policy Bypass via Incorrect Operation Name Normalization
- CVE-2026-100307 - Missing authorization on the external management API in mcp-gateway-registry enables privilege escalation to registry administrator
- CVE-2026-127119 - Unverified ownership of the default EMR cluster log location in AWS SDK for pandas
- CVE-2026-124848 - Incorrect default permissions on session transcripts and prompt history in Kiro CLI
- CVE-2026-124033 - Relative path traversal in the log export commands in AWS ParallelCluster CLI
- CVE-2026-126087 - Untrusted search path in OpenJD Sessions for Python and the AWS Deadline Cloud worker agent
- CVE-2026-126793 - Privilege escalation in Aurora PostgreSQL dialect detection in AWS Advanced Go Wrapper