Issue #282
Monday · October 12, 2026
🥖 Palate Cleanser
Yooooo,
The cloud is still the real world. Overnight on 7-8 October, drones hit Yandex's Sasovo data center in Russia, and the fire took a whole Yandex Cloud availability zone, ru-central1-b, offline for days (piyokango's write-up, in Japanese, so let your browser translate it). Yandex ended up arranging for rival Russian clouds to take in its stranded customers. If that sounds familiar, it's because it happened to AWS in March, when "objects struck" a data center in me-central-1 (issue 250). Multiple AZs are not a backup plan.
If you maintain anything on GitHub, watch out for GhostAction, which is back and now digs through your whole git history for old AWS keys and other secrets.
Have we all been assimilated into the Borg cube because the titles of all 3 posts today all follow the same template? Hmmm.
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📋 Chef's selections
Beyond valid credentials: How exposed AWS keys are tested for Amazon Bedrock access
Attackers who collect stolen AWS keys check each one before they use it, to see if it still works and what it can do. Usually they want to run cryptominers on EC2 or send spam through SES. Now they also check whether a key can call Bedrock, because people will pay for cheap access to models like Claude. Martin found a credential harvesting platform probing more than 80 Datadog customers, plus two checker scripts on VirusTotal. One script calls GetCallerIdentity, then ListFoundationModels across regions, then a Converse request that just says "ping" with a 4-token limit. Cheap, quiet, and enough to tell the attacker what the key is worth. Apparently there's a single error that tells the script that every Claude model is blocked, so it stops trying in that region. Detection ideas and IOCs are at the end.
AgentCorruption: How A Single Prompt Collapsed The Entire Cloud Security Model
by Tamir Ishay Sharbat and Lana Salameh
I'm sensing a theme here. Allowing execution role creds to be stolen = bad. Previous examples include Ori Hadad grabbing credentials from the Code Interpreter's metadata service, and Sergio Garcia doing the same through a package name injection in last week's issue. AgentCore Runtime runs each agent in a microVM that can still reach the instance metadata service. The Zenity team prompt-injected an agent into making an HTTP request to 169.254.169.254, and it handed back its execution role's credentials, which worked from outside AgentCore. The default role was over-permissioned, so those credentials could pull other agents' container images, invoke private agents, read users' conversations with ListEvents and plant persistent memories with CreateEvent. AWS called it "documented and expected" and made new agents IMDSv2-only in February. Zenity only saw the default role narrowed in late September.
Inside Terraplane: How We Built Our Own Secure, Developer-Friendly Terraform at Act
Terraform changes infrastructure in two steps. A "plan" works out what would change, and an "apply" actually makes the changes. Many pipelines have one powerful set of AWS credentials around for both steps, so anything sneaky that runs during a plan gets the keys to everything. Evyatar's team built their own runner that gives each run separate, fresh AWS credentials that expire after about an hour. Every request for credentials carries a signed label saying which workspace and which step it's for, and AWS only gives the plan step a read-only role. Only a run a person has approved can get the role that makes changes (unless a workspace opts into auto-apply), so your favorite agent or an attacker can plan changes but can't press Apply. Cool but can we has the source code pls?
🥗 AWS security blogs
- 📢 AWS Security Hub now exports findings to S3 in CSV or JSON format
- 📢 AWS Lambda supports OAuth authentication for self-managed Apache Kafka event sources
- 📢 Amazon SageMaker Unified Studio now supports custom Tooling blueprints
- 📢 OpenAI GPT-6.1 Sol now supports Ultrafast mode on Amazon Bedrock
- 📢 AWS Network Firewall adds wildcard support for container attribute filters
- 📢 Amazon GuardDuty RDS Protection now detects data exfiltration and destruction in Aurora and RDS databases
- 📢 AWS Batch now publishes job metrics to Amazon CloudWatch
- 📢 AWS Certificate Manager now supports ACME issuance through AWS PrivateLink
- 📢 AWS IAM Identity Center now supports network access controls for Identity Store
- 📢 AWS Continuum for Penetration Testing now supports continuous penetration testing integrated directly into your CI/CD pipeline
- 📢 AWS Batch now supports Amazon EKS access entry authentication
- 📢 AWS Private CA now provides detailed certificate issuance logs
- 📢 Announcing Amazon Nova 2.5 Sonic with improved reasoning for voice agents
- Protect MCP Endpoints at the Edge with Amazon CloudFront and AWS WAF by Jaiganesh Girinathan
- Configuring your AI vulnerability harness, Part 2: The steering file by Justin Kontny
- Building your AI vulnerability harness, Part 1 by Nidhi Ramakant
- Part 1 – Cybersecurity journeys: I didn’t plan this by Shannon Brazil
- Improving SPIRE security and resiliency with AWS managed services by Brendan Paul
- Identity-aware AI data agents with AWS Lake Formation and Trusted Identity Propagation by Thiyagarajan Mani
- AWS Continuum sets a new standard in autonomous code security by Alexander Greaves-Tunnell
🍛 Reddit threads on r/aws
🤖 Dessert
Every machine-tracked change this week. Nobody else assembles this.
🧁 IAM permission changes
🍪 API changes
🍹 IAM managed policy changes
☕ CloudFormation resource changes
No resource updates this week.
📺 AWS security bulletins
- CVE-2026-107332 - Insecure default file permissions on cached credentials in AWS Toolkit for Visual Studio Code
- CVE-2026-105812 and CVE-2026-106032: Issue with Bedrock AgentCore Starter Toolkit - Import Agent Code Injection and SSRF
- CVE-2026-107322 - OS command injection in Amazon Agent Plugins for AWS databases-on-aws
- CVE-2026-108096: Improper authorization in query resolvers for SQL-backed models in AWS Amplify API Category
- CVE-2026-107608: Improper link resolution in asset bundling output handling in aws-cdk-lib
- CVE-2026-107352 - Missing authorization checks in Amazon Athena engine version 3 request handling
- CVE-2026-105811 - Authorization bypass through a user-controlled key in the Amazon Q Business Lambda hook sample in QnABot on AWS
- CVE-2026-107783 - Insertion of sensitive information into log file in AWS Tools for PowerShell