Issue #279
Monday · September 21, 2026
🥖 Palate Cleanser
A new AgentCore Runtime went GA this week. It made me want to rant about how important AgentCore is as a concept. We are all building agents like a bunch of animals... On our desktops, inside Mac minis, on EC2 instances, inside random SaaS platforms. We are giving them access to all sorts of data, and pushing untrusted input from all over the internet into their LLM loops. It's mental. Hacking is turning into a competition of who can best spray the internet with prompt injection that triggers the most agents.
AgentCore isn't perfect (see Chef's selections) but it has most of the things we need to at least have a go at building and deploying secure agents - sandboxed runtimes, input and output guardrails, policies, credential vault etc. This is my pitch to everyone to move their agents to something like AgentCore before the hacking roflkopter cometh.
Also, today's issue is packed with deep technical goodies! It was a good week in content but still no fwd:cloudsec EU vids.
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📋 Chef's selections
A Vault with a Heap-View: The Uncomfortable Space Between AgentCore Harness and Identity
by Niv Rabin
AgentCore Identity stores credentials for your agents. You reference them by ARN, the plaintext stays on the AWS side, and everything is encrypted and behind IAM. Niv wanted to know what happens at the moment the harness actually needs to use one. He put a hidden HTML comment in a support ticket telling the agent to curl a script and run it. The harness shell tool is enabled by default and runs as root, so the script read the harness process's memory and pulled the plaintext JWT straight out of the heap. From his laptop, with no AWS access, he used that token to call the downstream MCP server. AWS closed it as informative and pointed at allowedTools, which only applies when you invoke the harness, not when you create it. I get it, the harness is meant to be easy to use and full featured but surely making the default prompt injection case code execution is not a good idea?
CodeConnections is what lets CodePipeline, CodeBuild and SageMaker reach into your GitHub or GitLab repos. Thomas has spent months working out how much access that actually hands over. In CodePipeline, the full clone option means the CodeBuild role gets codeconnections:UseConnection, and that single permission can push and pull any repository the connection can see, not just the one the pipeline is for. The undocumented API the console uses lets the same permission list, create and delete repositories. This post takes that to SageMaker. The managed roles AWS creates for Unified Studio and the MLOps templates grant UseConnection with only a tag condition, so anyone who can run code in a Unified Studio notebook, or in the MLOps pipelines, gets the same reach into your source control. The conditions to fix this exist. AWS just doesn't set them.
Exploring the new AWS Sign Up experience
by Scott Piper
The Cloud Historian is back in ASD. AWS changed how new accounts get created and Scott went through it to see what you actually end up with. It's three accounts in an organization: one for you, a management account that applies the SCPs and RCPs, and an identity account. You only see yours until you upgrade. Sign-in is a Builder ID with an emailed code, so there's no root user to lose. There's a $20 budget wired to an SCP and an RCP that blocks anything outside the org. Then it gets odd. No trail is configured, and the free tier SCP is an allowlist that blocks GuardDuty, Security Hub, Detective, Inspector, Macie and Access Analyzer entirely, while a public bucket is still a couple of clicks away. AWS is trying to make account setup frictionless while putting users on a path to a sane org setup. That comes with tough trade-offs though and I guess we'll see whether they were good trade-offs.
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🥗 AWS security blogs
- 📢 AWS Continuum now supports credential testing and accessible domain suggestions
- 📢 AWS Resilience Hub adds three new capabilities
- 📢 AWS Batch now supports bulk job cancellation and termination
- 📢 AWS Elastic Beanstalk introduces Cluster Mode to run multiple applications on shared infrastructure
- 📢 Amazon Quick now generates individual sheets and builds analyses from an image
- 📢 Amazon WorkSpaces adds support for NVIDIA Blackwell GPU instances
- 📢 AWS STS simplifies session token size limits and adds session token size monitoring
- 📢 AWS improves regional resiliency for root user sign-in
- 📢 AWS Glue zero-ETL adds target table property ownership and conflict detection
- Choosing the right inspection architecture for AWS Network Firewall by Kunj Thacker
- Continuous monitoring under FedRAMP 20x: Replacing annual assessments with persistent validation by Dr. Tommy Kromer
- Run open weight models on Amazon Bedrock in AWS European Sovereign Cloud by Marta Taggart
- Architecting a secure landing zone in the AWS European Sovereign Cloud by Pablo Pagani
- AWS STS simplifies session token size limits and adds session token size monitoring by Rishi Tripathy
- Architecting resilient authentication with Amazon Cognito multi-Region replication by Abrom Douglas
- Operationalizing least privilege: Automate IAM remediation through your CI/CD pipeline by Luis Pastor
- AWS Security Reference Architecture: A deep dive into PCI DSS compliance by Avik Mukherjee
🍛 Reddit threads on r/aws
🤖 Dessert
Every machine-tracked change this week. Nobody else assembles this.
🧁 IAM permission changes
🍪 API changes
🍹 IAM managed policy changes
☕ CloudFormation resource changes
No resource updates this week.
🎮 Amazon Linux vulnerabilities
📺 AWS security bulletins
- CVE-2026-92943 - Improper validation of certificate with host mismatch in AWS IoT Device SDK for Python
- CVE-2026-86831: Improper validation of pod identifier uniqueness in aws-network-policy-agent in Amazon EKS
- CVE-2026-86830 - Incorrect privilege assignment in Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) for AWS IAM Identity Center
🚬 Security documentation changes
No changes this week.