原创 wzt 2021-02-23 11:25
Ios13增加了判断对象是否属于zone的安全检查,这将导致以前通过伪造内核对象的漏洞利用手段变得困难了
Ios13增加了判断对象是否属于zone的安全检查,这将导致以前通过伪造内核对象的漏洞利用手段变得困难了很多,比如ipc_port,伪造的对象通常来自于用户空间,那么在引用这个对象时,xnu引入了zone_require、zone_id_require、zone_owns三个函数来做对象合法性检查。
osfmk/kern/zalloc.c:``void``zone_require(zone_t zone, void *addr)``{ if (__probable(from_general_submap(addr, zone_elem_size(zone)) &&[1] (zone_has_index(zone, zone_native_meta_from_addr(addr)->zm_index)))) { [2] return; }
if (__probable(gzalloc_enabled())) { return; } zone_require_panic(zone, addr);[3]``}
[1]处的from_general_submap判断对象的地址是否在整个大的有效范围内。
`zone_range_contains(&zone_info.zi_general_range, (vm_offset_t)(addr), size)`
({ rmin = (r)->min_address; rmax = (r)->max_address; })
__header_always_inline bool``zone_range_contains(const struct zone_map_range *r, vm_offset_t addr, vm_offset_t size)``{ vm_offset_t rmin, rmax;
zone_range_load(r, rmin, rmax); return (addr >= rmin) & (addr + size >= rmin) & (addr + size <= rmax);``}
[2] 处的zone_has_index才是判断对象是否属于某个特定的zone。通过zone_native_meta_from_addr函数将对象地址转为对应的meta数据结构,meta的zm_index指示的是meta对应的zone在zone_array数组里的索引,这样通过索引加上zone_array数组地址就能判断是否指向了正确的zone地址。
static inline bool
zone_has_index(zone_t z, zone_id_t zid)``{ return zone_array + zid == z;``}
__abortlike``static void``zone_require_panic(zone_t zone, void *addr)``{ uint32_t zindex; zone_t other; if (!from_zone_map(addr, zone_elem_size(zone))) { panic("zone_require failed: address not in a zone (addr: %p)", addr); }
zindex = zone_native_meta_from_addr(addr)->zm_index; other = &zone_array[zindex]; if (zindex >= os_atomic_load(&num_zones, relaxed) || !other->z_self) { panic("zone_require failed: invalid zone index %d " "(addr: %p, expected: %s%s)", zindex, addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name); } else { panic("zone_require failed: address in unexpected zone id %d (%s%s) " "(addr: %p, expected: %s%s)", zindex, zone_heap_name(other), other->z_name, addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name); }``}
当比对失败时,[3]处调用了zone_require_panic来试图分析是哪种情况造成的并panic系统。
zone_require是zalloc内存分配器提供的kpi接口, 当其他内核子系统需要判断某个object是否合法时要主动调用,因为如果在内存分配器的alloc或free路径里在去判断对象合法性时为时已晚,漏洞攻击已经完成了。
Ios13也是类似的逻辑:
同时还可以发现, 最新的xnu内存分配器对对象、meta、zone的合法性做了极其严格的检查,这些优秀的漏洞缓解方法需要移植到linux中去。
static struct zone_page_metadata *
zone_allocated_element_resolve(zone_t zone, vm_offset_t addr, vm_offset_t *pagep, zone_addr_kind_t *kindp)``{ struct zone_page_metadata *meta; zone_addr_kind_t kind; vm_offset_t page; vm_offset_t esize = zone_elem_size(zone);
kind = zone_addr_kind(addr, esize); page = trunc_page(addr); meta = zone_meta_from_addr(addr, kind);
if (kind == ZONE_ADDR_NATIVE) { if (meta->zm_secondary_page) { if (meta->zm_percpu) { zone_invalid_element_addr_panic(zone, addr); } page -= ptoa(meta->zm_page_count); meta -= meta->zm_page_count; }
} else if (!zone->allows_foreign) { zone_page_metadata_foreign_confusion_panic(zone, addr); } else if (!from_foreign_range(addr, esize)) { zone_invalid_foreign_addr_panic(zone, addr); } else if (!pmap_kernel_va(addr)) { zone_invalid_element_addr_panic(zone, addr); }
if (!zone_allocated_element_offset_is_valid(zone, addr, page, kind)) { zone_invalid_element_addr_panic(zone, addr); }
if (!zone_has_index(zone, meta->zm_index)) { zone_page_metadata_index_confusion_panic(zone, addr, meta); } if (kindp) { *kindp = kind; }
if (pagep) { *pagep = page; }
return meta;``}
zone_metadata_corruption(zone_t zone, struct zone_page_metadata *meta, const char *kind)``{ panic("zone metadata corruption: %s (meta %p, zone %s%s)", kind, meta, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_invalid_element_addr_panic(zone_t zone, vm_offset_t addr)``{ panic("zone element pointer validation failed (addr: %p, zone %s%s)", (void *)addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_page_metadata_index_confusion_panic(zone_t zone, vm_offset_t addr, struct zone_page_metadata *meta)``{ panic("%p not in the expected zone %s%s (%d != %d)", (void *)addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name, meta->zm_index, zone_index(zone));``}
zone_page_metadata_native_queue_corruption(zone_t zone, zone_pva_t *queue)``{ panic("foreign metadata index %d enqueued in native head %p from zone %s%s", queue->packed_address, queue, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_page_metadata_list_corruption(zone_t zone, struct zone_page_metadata *meta)``{ panic("metadata list corruption through element %p detected in zone %s%s", meta, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_page_metadata_foreign_queue_corruption(zone_t zone, zone_pva_t *queue)``{ panic("native metadata index %d enqueued in foreign head %p from zone %s%s", queue->packed_address, queue, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_page_metadata_foreign_confusion_panic(zone_t zone, vm_offset_t addr)``{ panic("manipulating foreign address %p in a native-only zone %s%s", (void *)addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_invalid_foreign_addr_panic(zone_t zone, vm_offset_t addr)``{ panic("addr %p being freed to foreign zone %s%s not from foreign range", (void *)addr, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name);``}
zone_page_meta_accounting_panic(zone_t zone, struct zone_page_metadata *meta, const char *kind)``{ panic("accounting mismatch (%s) for zone %s%s, meta %p", kind, zone_heap_name(zone), zone->z_name, meta);``}