| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1590.001 | Domain Properties |
| T1590.002 | DNS |
| T1590.003 | Network Trust Dependencies |
| T1590.004 | Network Topology |
| T1590.005 | IP Addresses |
| T1590.006 | Network Security Appliances |
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites).[1] Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
ID: T1590.004
Sub-technique of:
T1590
ⓘ
Tactic:
Reconnaissance
Platforms: PRE
Version: 1.0
Created: 02 October 2020
Last Modified: 12 May 2026
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0062 | Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map a complete network topology of the target infrastructure.[2] |
| G1016 | FIN13 | FIN13 has searched for infrastructure that can provide remote access to an environment for targeting efforts.[3] |
| G0069 | MuddyWater | MuddyWater has mapped target networks; access to this information and more is then shared/sold to other Iran threat actors.[4] |
| G1045 | Salt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has used configuration files from exploited network devices to help discover upstream and downstream network segments.[5][6] |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance of victim networks including identifying network topologies.[7] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise | This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0819 | Detection of Network Topology | AN1951 | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
-
[Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.](https://dnsdumpster.com/) -
[Anthropic. (2025, November). Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign. Retrieved April 20, 2026.](https://assets.anthropic.com/m/ec212e6566a0d47/original/Disrupting-the-first-reported-AI-orchestrated-cyber-espionage-campaign.pdf) -
[Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico) -
[FalconFeeds.io. (2026, March 6). MuddyWater in the Iran–Israel Cyber War: From PowerShell Scripts to Rust Implants. Retrieved March 12, 2026.](https://falconfeeds.io/blogs/muddywater-in-the-iran-israel-cyber-war-from-powershell-scripts-to-rust-implants) -
[Cisco Talos. (2025, February 20). Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon. Retrieved February 24, 2025.](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/salt-typhoon-analysis/) -
[CISA. (2025, September 3). Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. Retrieved September 22, 2026.](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a) -
[CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf)