原创 Hsin Tsao 2022-09-04 20:31 上海
当应用是通过用户上传的XML文件或POST请求进行数据的传输,并且应用没有禁止XML引用外部实体,也没有过滤用户提交的XML数据,那么就会产生XML外部实体注入漏洞。
XXE 漏洞在owasp2021中位置:
A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration CWE-611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference(XXE)
防护
使用语言中推荐的禁用外部实体的方法
这里以 Java 语言为例子说明。
使用XML库的Java应用程序特别容易受到XXE攻击,因为大多数Java XML解析器的默认设置是启用XXE。为了安全地使用这些解析器,必须在使用的解析器中显式禁用XXE。下面描述如何在最常用的Java XML解析器中禁用XXE。
01.DocumentBuilderFactory
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();``String FEATURE = null;``FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl";``dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, true);
FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities";``dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities";``dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd";``dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);``dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
02.Dom4j
org.dom4j.io.SAXReader
saxReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);``saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);``saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();``builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl",true);``builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);``builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);``builder.setExpandEntities(false);``Document doc = builder.build(new File(fileName));
javax.xml.stream.XMLInputFactory
// This disables DTDs entirely for that factory``xmlInputFactory.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.SUPPORT_DTD, false);``// This causes XMLStreamException to be thrown if external DTDs are accessed.``xmlInputFactory.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");``// disable external entities``xmlInputFactory.setProperty("javax.xml.stream.isSupportingExternalEntities", false);
org.xml.sax.XMLReader
XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();``reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);``// This may not be strictly required as DTDs shouldn't be allowed at all, per previous line.``reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);``reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);``reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
RASP防护
上面的修复方式在具体实施时存在缺陷:
- 如果读取xml的代码在第三方包中(或者依赖框架),一般很难直接修改,必须pr框架/包提供者来修复;
这里以dom4j为例子来说RASP如何修复XX漏洞
package com.example.controller;
import org.dom4j.Document;``import org.dom4j.Element;``import org.dom4j.io.SAXReader;``import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;``import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;``import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;``import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
("/xxe/dom4j")``public class Dom4jController { ("/post/dom4j.do") public ResponseEntity<String> documentBuilder1(String xml, int fix) throws Exception { return ResponseEntity.ok(dom4j(xml, fix)); }
`public static String dom4j(String xml, int fix) throws Exception {` `SAXReader saxReader = new SAXReader();` `// 启用修复方式` `if (fix == 1) {` `saxReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);` `saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);` `saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);` `saxReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);` `}` `ByteArrayInputStream byteArrayInputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(xml.getBytes());` `Document document = saxReader.read(byteArrayInputStream);` `Element element = document.getRootElement();` `return element.getText();` `}``}`
dom4j版本
<dependency> <groupId>org.dom4j</groupId> <artifactId>dom4j</artifactId> <version>2.0.0</version>``</dependency>
POC
curl --location --request POST 'http://localhost:8080/xxe/dom4j/post/dom4j.do' \``--header 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \``--data-urlencode 'xml=<root>&xxe;</root>' \``--data-urlencode 'fix=0'
读取 /etc/passwd文本内容
返回结果:
##``# User Database``# # Note that this file is consulted directly only when the system is running``# in single-user mode. At other times this information is provided by``# Open Directory.``#``# See the opendirectoryd(8) man page for additional information about``# Open Directory.``##``nobody:*:-2:-2:Unprivileged User:/var/empty:/usr/bin/false``root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh``daemon:*:1:1:System Services:/var/root:/usr/bin/false``...
`/**` `* read重载方法最终调用 read(InputSource)` `*` `* @see org.dom4j.io.SAXReader#read(InputSource)` `*/` `public void closeDom4jXXE() {` `final String className = "org.dom4j.io.SAXReader";` `final String methdName = "read";` `new EventWatchBuilder(moduleEventWatcher)` `.onClass(className)` `.includeBootstrap()` `.onBehavior(methdName)` `.withParameterTypes("org.xml.sax.InputSource")` `.onWatch(new AdviceListener() {` `public void before(Advice advice) throws Throwable {` `if (!enableCheck) {` `return;` `}` `SAXReader saxReader = (SAXReader) advice.getTarget();` `saxReader.setFeature(FEATURE_DEFAULTS_1, true);` `saxReader.setFeature(FEATURE_DEFAULTS_2, false);` `saxReader.setFeature(FEATURE_DEFAULTS_3, false);` `}`
`protected void afterThrowing(Advice advice) throws Throwable {` `requestInfoThreadLocal.remove();` `}` `});` `}`
需要注意的是,JRASP 对Dom4j的hook类做了进一步的优化,hook了更加底层的方法(如下所示)。
public Document read(InputSource in) throws DocumentException
(经过debug和实际dump字节码发现,open-rasp 存在重复插桩、防护逻辑执行两次的问题。相关issue:https://github.com/baidu/openrasp/issues/396)
选取hook类一般是十分慎重,必须了解hook类的功能,选取类的一般性原则如下:
- 能防护漏洞;
- 选取更底层方法,避免被被绕过;
- 在保证功能的基础上hook类尽量少;
目前JRASP已经具备上面5类常用XML解析器的漏洞防护插件。
XXE漏洞案例:
https://www.jrasp.com/case/CVE-2018-15531.html
https://www.jrasp.com/case/CVE-2018-1259.html