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云原生安全-从k8s日志审计视角检测自动化工具攻击

聚合站 SecWiki技术 作者 哔哩哔哩技术 发布 2023年4月18日 12:00 入库 2026-11-18T11:21:23

本期作者

张智

哔哩哔哩高级安全工程师

  1. 前言

1.1 背景

随着云原生技术的普及,其暴露出来的攻击面也被黑客们念念不忘,相关的攻击技术也跟着被“普及”,自动化漏洞利用攻击工具更是如雨后春笋般出现在GitHub开源平台,其中比较有代表性的如cdk-team/CDK。其是一款为容器环境定制的渗透测试工具,在已攻陷的容器内部提供零依赖的常用命令及PoC/EXP。集成Docker/K8s场景特有的 逃逸、横向移动、持久化利用方式,插件化管理。

在漏洞利用门槛如此低廉的今天,作为企业安全的建设者(搬砖人),除了考虑部署容器层面运行时检测平台,在k8s api-server层面,启用日志审计功能,也是一个成本低廉又高效发现入侵攻击的途径。

通过对api-server的日志进行审计分析,对于攻击者的信息收集行为,部署k8s cronjob后门、利用rbac做权限提升等持久化攻击行为都能及时的发现并输出告警。

1.2 kubernetes日志审计介绍

Kubernetes 审计功能提供了与安全相关的按时间顺序排列的记录集,记录单个用户、管理员或系统其他组件影响系统的活动顺序。 它能帮助集群管理员处理以下问题:

审计日志示例(图片来自参考[5]

如何开启日志审计

1、api-server命令行启动时,添加如下参数

--audit-policy-file=/etc/kubernetes/audit/audit-default-policy.yaml # 审计策略文件--audit-log-path=/data/log/audit/audit.log# kube-apiserver 输出的审计日志文件,此处以日志文件落地的方式做日志收集--audit-log-maxbackup=10# kube-apiserver 审计日志文件的最大备份数量--audit-log-format=json #日志保存格式--audit-log-maxage=10#日志最大保留时间--audit-log-maxsize=500# 单个日志文件最大为500M

2、kubeadm启动时

修改api-server配置文件/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml,增加如下内容

--audit-policy-file=/etc/kubernetes/audit/audit-default-policy.yaml--audit-log-path=/data/log/audit/audit.log--audit-log-maxbackup=10--audit-log-format=json--audit-log-maxage=10--audit-log-maxsize=500

  1. 攻击行为检测

2.1 分析流程

若攻击者通过各种手段拿到一个容器shell环境后,下一步必然是利用这个容器进行信息收集,获取更多敏感信息或机器资源,此时,CDK作为一款自动化的攻击工具,就让整个攻击过程如虎添翼,大大提高攻击效率。

作为甲方安全的守护者,从安全建设的角度,如何有效及时的发现攻击者的入侵行为,是一个无法避开的问题。本文通过观察cdk的攻击行为,从k8s日志审计的角度罗列一些入侵检测的常见规则。

目前,针对于日志的审计分析,我们落地方案的整个流程为:

注:下列场景,仅限于原生的CDK行为检测,如果攻击者具备开发能力,修改对应特征,可以绕过对应的检测规则。

2.2 信息收集

CDK在容器内主要收集以下信息:

工具在镜像内运行,其信息收集的结果执如下:

从图上可知,信息收集的整个过程,存在与api-server交互的仅有网络探测部分,总共会向api-server发送三条请求,分别为API-server、namespace、api信息探测。

2.2.1 探测API-server

audit.log

{"kind":"Event","apiVersion":"audit.k8s.io/v1","level":"Metadata","stage":"ResponseComplete","requestURI":"/","verb":"get","user": {"username":"system:anonymous","groups": ["system:unauthenticated"]},"sourceIPs": ["172.18.0.2"],"userAgent":"Go-http-client/1.1","responseStatus": {"metadata": {},"status":"Failure","reason":"Forbidden","code":403},"requestReceivedTimestamp":"2023-02-02T08:29:12.189459Z","stageTimestamp":"2023-02-02T08:29:12.189553Z","annotations": {"authorization.k8s.io/decision":"forbid","authorization.k8s.io/reason":""}}

2.2.2 列举namespace

audit.log

{"kind":"Event","apiVersion":"audit.k8s.io/v1","level":"Metadata","auditID":"41770e7a-1827-4a14-860f-a812d3db1647","stage":"ResponseComplete","requestURI":"/api/v1/namespaces","verb":"list","user": {"username":"system:serviceaccount:test:default","uid":"63b8dd88-88dd-4426-bdd1-7966906dc0d5","groups": ["system:serviceaccounts","system:serviceaccounts:test","system:authenticated"]},"sourceIPs": ["172.18.0.2"],"userAgent":"Go-http-client/1.1","objectRef": {"resource":"namespaces","apiVersion":"v1"},"responseStatus": {"metadata": {},"status":"Failure","reason":"Forbidden","code":403},"requestReceivedTimestamp":"2023-02-02T08:29:12.205422Z","stageTimestamp":"2023-02-02T08:29:12.205485Z","annotations": {"authorization.k8s.io/decision":"forbid","authorization.k8s.io/reason":""}}

2.2.3 探测可访问的api

跟namespace类似,只不过requestURI为/apis

2.2.4 总结

综上, 上述日志中可概述为,当cdk在做信息收集时,会向api-server请求3次,分别访问/,/apis,/api/v1/namespaces,可根据这些特征做告警规则

1、userAgent: Go-http-client/1.1# CDK特定的userAgent,此时,该字段为主要特征2、responseStatus.code:403#默认serviceaccount无权限时 api-server返回的状态码3、requestURI: / # 访问根目录

2.3 漏洞利用

Exploit模块包含的功能:

2.3.1 容器逃逸

其中,容器逃逸层面,一般是不需要与api-server做交互的,也就不会留下日志。但部分容器逃逸手段是利用错误配置的pod在创建时实施攻击。因此,容器逃逸的检测必须前置到容器创建时,记录下应用请求的权限,然后结合运行时入侵检测做进一步监控。

当一个拥有privilege、sys_admin、network、ipc等特殊权限的pod创建时,它的日志记录是这样的。

audit.json

{"kind":"Event","apiVersion":"audit.k8s.io/v1","level":"RequestResponse","stage":"ResponseComplete","requestURI":"/api/v1/namespaces/testpods/pods","verb":"create","user": {"username":"kubernetes-admin","groups": ["system:masters","system:authenticated"]},"sourceIPs": ["172.18.0.1"],"userAgent":"kubectl1.16.15/v1.16.15 (darwin/amd64) kubernetes/2adc8d7","objectRef": {"resource":"pods","namespace":"testpods","name":"testpod","apiVersion":"v1"},"responseStatus": {"metadata": {},"code":201},"responseObject": {"kind":"Pod","apiVersion":"v1","metadata": {"name":"testpod","namespace":"testpods","selfLink":"/api/v1/namespaces/testpods/pods/testpod","uid":"e717d204-7e6d-4608-998b-648a8667e8e1","resourceVersion":"13517","creationTimestamp":"2023-02-02T09:51:10Z","labels": {"creator":"zhiye","team":"teamf"}},"spec": {"volumes": [{"name":"rootfs","hostPath": {"path":"/","type":""}}],"containers": [{"name":"trpe","image":"alpine","command": ["/bin/sh","-c","tail -f /dev/null"],"resources": {},"volumeMounts": [{"name":"default-token-mm6s8","readOnly":true,"mountPath":"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"}],"terminationMessagePath":"/dev/termination-log","terminationMessagePolicy":"File","imagePullPolicy":"Always","securityContext": {"capabilities": {"add": ["SYS_ADMIN"]},"privileged":true}}],"restartPolicy":"Always","terminationGracePeriodSeconds":30,"dnsPolicy":"ClusterFirst","serviceAccountName":"default","serviceAccount":"default","hostNetwork":true,"hostPID":true,"hostIPC":true,"securityContext": {},"schedulerName":"default-scheduler","tolerations": [{"key":"node.kubernetes.io/not-ready","operator":"Exists","effect":"NoExecute","tolerationSeconds":300},{"key":"node.kubernetes.io/unreachable","operator":"Exists","effect":"NoExecute","tolerationSeconds":300}],"priority":0,"enableServiceLinks":true},"status": {"phase":"Pending","qosClass":"BestEffort"}},"requestReceivedTimestamp":"2023-02-02T09:51:10.632436Z","stageTimestamp":"2023-02-02T09:51:10.660958Z","annotations": {"authorization.k8s.io/decision":"allow","authorization.k8s.io/reason":""}}

从日志上可以看出,针对于错误配置导致的逃逸,我们可以关注以下几个日志字段,制定告警规则。

responseObject.spec.volumes # 检测敏感卷,是否挂载docker.sock等responseObject.spec.containers.volumeMounts # 检测敏感挂载,是否挂载docker.sock等responseObject.spec.containers.securityContext.capabilities.add # 是否使用SYS_ADMIN权限,(字段嵌套这么多层,真的得吐槽responseObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged # 检测是否为特权pod容器responseObject.spec.hostNetwork # 是否使用宿主机网络responseObject.spec.hostPID # 是否使用宿主机hostPIDresponseObject.spec.hostIPC # 是否共享宿主机内存responseObject.spec.serviceAccount # 是否使用特殊的serviceaccount 默认为default

2.3.2 网络探测

此功能为端口扫描+指纹识别,不涉及与API交互,未产生日志。

2.3.3 信息窃取

与api-server交互的为secrets、config和psp,如果是自动获取的话,cdk会发送两次请求,分别使用匿名账户和当前serviceaccout做list动作。

下边列举些主要特征

requestURI: /api/v1/secrets,requestURI: /api/v1/configmapsrequestURI: /apis/policy/v1beta1/podsecuritypoliciesuserAgent: Go-http-client/1.1user.username:"system:anonymous"responseStatus.code:403"verb":"list"

2.3.4 权限提升

RBAC权限绕过

日志如下

{"kind":"Event","apiVersion":"audit.k8s.io/v1","level":"RequestResponse","auditID":"bfc643d6-8337-434e-9dec-ba41dd36bfa7","stage":"ResponseComplete","requestURI":"/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/pods","verb":"create","user": {"username":"system:serviceaccount:test:default","uid":"63b8dd88-88dd-4426-bdd1-7966906dc0d5","groups": ["system:serviceaccounts","system:serviceaccounts:test","system:authenticated"]},"sourceIPs": ["172.18.0.3"],"userAgent":"Go-http-client/1.1","objectRef": {"resource":"pods","namespace":"kube-system","apiVersion":"v1"},"responseStatus": {"metadata": {},"status":"Failure","reason":"Forbidden","code":403},"responseObject": {"kind":"Status","apiVersion":"v1","metadata": {},"status":"Failure","message":"pods is forbidden: User \"system:serviceaccount:test:default\" cannot create resource \"pods\" in API group \"\" in the namespace \"kube-system\"","reason":"Forbidden","details": {"kind":"pods"},"code":403},"requestReceivedTimestamp":"2023-02-03T09:56:24.061825Z","stageTimestamp":"2023-02-03T09:56:24.061888Z","annotations": {"authorization.k8s.io/decision":"forbid","authorization.k8s.io/reason":""}}

由上可发现如下特征:

Pod内serviceaccount无权限的情况requestURI: /api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/podsuserAgent: Go-http-client/1.1responseStatus.code:403Pod内serviceaccount有权限的情况requestURI: /api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/podsresponseObject.metadata.selfLink: /api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/pods/cdk-rbac-bypass-create-podresponseObject.metadata.spec.containers.args: cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/tokenverb: create

2.3.5 持久化

部署daemonset后门

源码是这样定义的(参考[6]):

体现到日志中,有以下几个点:

objectRef.name: cdk-backdoor-daemonsetobjectRef.namespace: kube-systemresponseObject.metadata.selfLink: /apis/apps/v1/namespaces/kube-system/daemonsets/cdk-backdoor-daemonsetresponseObject.spec.template.spec.volumes.hostPath.path: /responseObject.spec.template.spec.containers.name: cdk-backdoor-podresponseObject.spec.template.spec.containers.securityContext[capabilities:ptivileged]:如图上所示responseObject.spec.template.spec.[hostNetwork|hostPID]:true

部署K8S CronJob

CDK源代码是这样定义的(参考[7]):

体现在日志中,特征有以下几点:

requestURI: /apis/batch/v1beta1/namespaces/kube-system/cronjobsverb: createobjectRef.name: cdk-backdoor-cronjobresponseObject.matadata.name: cdk-backdoor-cronjobresponseObject.matadata.selfLink: /apis/batch/v1beta1/namespaces/kube-system/cronjobs/cdk-backdoor-cronjobresponseObject.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec.containers.name: cdk-backdoor-cronjob-container

部署影子k8s api-server

在pod权限足够的情况下,通过创建shadow api-server做权限维持,详情见参考[4]

在非二开的情况下,通过k8s日志升级可检测以下几个字段

objectRef.name: -shadow-responseObject.metadata.labels.component: kube-apiservershadowresponseObject.spec.containers.command:"--secure-port=9444"

2.3.6 总结

因为漏洞利用部分,动作都普遍较大,因此可观测字段已不仅仅局限于userAgent,其特征均比较明显,极富有工具本身特色

2.4 API利用

2.4.1 Tool模块

此处需要关注的(跟api-server有交互的)为kcurl命令,此命令可借助高权限serviceaccount账户列举/使用k8s资源。

执行./cdk kcurl default get 'https://10.96.0.1:443/api/v1/nodes' ,日志内容如下:

audit.log

{"kind":"Event","apiVersion":"audit.k8s.io/v1","level":"Metadata","auditID":"418cafa5-2c1e-4fbf-b086-3d68e321d2bb","stage":"ResponseComplete","requestURI":"/api/v1/nodes","verb":"list","user": {"username":"system:serviceaccount:test:default","uid":"63b8dd88-88dd-4426-bdd1-7966906dc0d5","groups": ["system:serviceaccounts","system:serviceaccounts:test","system:authenticated"]},"sourceIPs": ["172.18.0.3"],"userAgent":"Go-http-client/1.1","objectRef": {"resource":"nodes","apiVersion":"v1"},"responseStatus": {"metadata": {},"code":200},"requestReceivedTimestamp":"2023-02-06T09:51:51.790260Z","stageTimestamp":"2023-02-06T09:51:51.791075Z","annotations": {"authorization.k8s.io/decision":"allow","authorization.k8s.io/reason":"RBAC: allowed by ClusterRoleBinding \"defaultadmin\" of ClusterRole \"cluster-admin\" to ServiceAccount \"default/test\""}}

日志中annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason给出了允许执行的原因。我们可以根据如下三个字段制定告警规则:

serviceaccount有权限的情况下:annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reasonannotations.authorization.k8s.io/decisionuserAgent: Go-http-client/1.1responseStatus.code:200无权限的情况下:userAgent: Go-http-client/1.1responseStatus.code:403

2.4.2 总结

因为tool模块需要借助高权限serviceaccount或token,因此,权限不足的情况下,api-server返回responseStatus.code: 403 的条目说明了api-server接受到了非预期请求,结合userAgent等信息便可输出可疑告警。

  1. 不仅仅是CDK

3.1 CVE-2022-3172 K8S聚合

API(Aggregation API)SSRF漏洞.

聚合 API 实际上是在 kube-apiserver 中运行的,在新 API 注册之前,它并不会工作。如果要添加新的 API,则需要创建一个APIService 对象,用来申请 Kubernetes 中新的 URL 路径。注册成功后,当有发送到此路径中的请求,则会被转发到已经注册的 APIService 上。

APIService 可以将客户端的请求转发到任意的 URL 上,这就有可能会导致 Client 发送请求时,所携带的一些认证信息可能会被发送给第三方。

通过日志审计监控responseStatus.code字段来进行判断是否有出现重定向的情况,通过检测如下字段:

responseObject.code:302responseObject.code:301

3.2 使用不合规镜像创建pod

除了cdk这种常见的攻击手法,还有一些常见的异常行为需要我们关注,比如一般企业内,pod创建使用的容器均会从企业私有的镜像仓库中拉取,此时如果日志中出现了公共仓库的镜像,则可判断为异常,可关注以下字段

verb : createlevel:RequestResponseesponseObject.kind:PodrequestObject.spec.containers.image:镜像仓库地址

3.3 pod命令执行

对于kubectl exec命令进行监控,可对如下字段进行监控,注:命令执行的后续无法通过日志审计来进一步监控,需结合运行时检测进一步分析

objectRef.subresource:execobjectRef.subresource:attachuserAgent

  1. 落地实践踩过的坑

1、主要为k8s日志类型比较多,且每种类型的字段名,字段数量均不一致,导致es在存储数据时存在索引内字段类型不一致无法解析存储的问题。

解决方案为对于字段不一致的obj,选择为不做深层次解析。(或者使用hdfs等存储方式,查询时对字段进行解析

2、日志量过大,导致api-server磁盘读写io过高

持续优化audit.yaml中的日志规则,对于其中的node/status,pod/status,coordination.k8s.io/leases等不做日志记录。

  1. 总结

本文从k8s日志审计的角度,分析当使用cdk等自动化攻击时,能够从日志中获取到的信息,并给出通过这些信息可监控字段的告警示例。因为这部分字段都比较固定,完全可以通过机器学习提升告警准确率。抛砖引玉,希望后续可以看到更多日志的分析防御角度。

当然,CDK作为开源工具,这些特征都可以做关键字替换。因此,笔者认为功夫应该用到平时,加强k8s的基线管控,比如避免出现高serviceaccount权限、通过准入策略限制使用的docker镜像,并部署容器运行时入侵检测平台。让安全能力覆盖每个环节,才能保证集群的安全稳定。

  1. 参考

[1]https://github.com/cdk-team/CDK

[2]https://www.cdxy.me/?p=839

[3]https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/

[4]https://discuss.kubernetes.io/t/security-advisory-cve-2022-3172-aggregated-api-server-can-cause-clients-to-be-redirected-ssrf/21322

[5]https://github.com/tencentyun/qcloud-documents/blob/master/product/%E5%AD%98%E5%82%A8%E4%B8%8ECDN/%E6%97%A5%E5%BF%97%E6%9C%8D%E5%8A%A1/%E6%9C%80%E4%BD%B3%E5%AE%9E%E8%B7%B5/TKE%20%E5%AE%A1%E8%AE%A1%E6%97%A5%E5%BF%97%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90.md

[6]https://github.com/cdk-team/CDK/blob/main/pkg/exploit/k8s_backdoor_daemonset.go#LL35-L87C2

[7]https://github.com/cdk-team/CDK/blob/main/pkg/exploit/k8s_cronjob.go#LL34-L59C2

以上是今天的分享内容,如果你有什么想法或疑问,欢迎大家在留言区与我们互动,如果喜欢本期内容的话,欢迎点个“在看”吧!

往期精彩指路

B站云原生混部技术实践

B站基于Clickhouse的下一代日志体系建设实践

B站埋点分析平台的构建之路

原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/nZu4p5ZSmyzOVhQleIXQpg